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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Third District Juvenile Court, in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah, to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is authorized pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-
3(2)(c) (as amended 1990). The case is consolidated on appeal with a domestic action filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is 
authorized pursuant to U.GA. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (as amended 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Appellee strongly disagrees with the Statement of the Issues as presented by 
Defendant/Appellant in his opening brief. Defendant makes the statement that one issue 
is: "[H]as Plaintiff caused the lower court to blatantly violate this Court's mandate?" Plaintiff 
argues that such is not an issue in this case, because the lower court has made its decisions 
independently after input from the parties. Plaintiffs conduct in persuading the lower court 
judge as to the correctness of her position is not at issue in this matter. 
The other claims by Defendant as to the Statement of the Issues constitute argument, 
and Plaintiff vehemently disagrees that the standards to be involved in this Court's review 
involve legal correctness as the Defendant argues. 
Only one single issue is involved in this appeal: Did the trial judge, the Honorable 
Olof A. Johansson, Third District Juvenile Court Judge meet the requirements of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in its first decision in this case found at 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) 
filed December 9, 1991, by providing "more detailed findings" of fact justifying his 
conclusions of law and judgment of termination of Defendant's parental rights? 
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Since Defendant challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact, Defendant must show 
that each challenged finding of fact was clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the 
evidence. The standard of review in this appeal is set out in State. In Interest of P.M., 790 
P.2d 562, (Utah App. 1990), as follows: 
The challenge to a factual finding must be conducted in two steps: 
(1) Appellant must first marshal all the evidence that supports 
the finding, and (2) then demonstrate to us that, despite this 
evidence, the finding is so lacking in support as to be "against the 
clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
790 P.2d at 567. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
U.C.A. § 78-3a-48(2) - set out in verbatim in Appendix 1. Although this statute 
was repleaded effective July 1,1992, it was in full force and effect at the time of the trial of 
this matter. 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a consolidated appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a determination by 
the Third District Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding, that Defen-
dant/Appellant's parental rights be terminated pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A. § 
78-3a-48 (as amended 1985) and subsequent Utah Supreme Court and appellate court 
decisions interpreting said statute. The Juvenile Court also ordered that a certified copy of 
the Juvenile Court Order should be filed with the Third District Court in Case No. 87-
3798DA, Kim Fazzio fWoodwardl v. Richard Cameron Fazzio. Said Order was filed on 
December 3, 1990, and the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson entered an "Order FormaUy 
Adopting Order of Third District Juvenile Court Terminating Parental Rights" on October 
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26, 1990. Judge Wilkinson had previously entered a Minute Entry dated April 24, 1990, 
declaring "the Order of the Juvenile Court on the termination of parental relationship shall 
be filed in this case and shall be binding on the parties.11 
The Utah Court of Appeals considered Defendant's original appeal in this matter in 
Case No. 900626-CA filed December 9,1991,823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 19911 (Appendix 2). 
In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded "for more detailed findings". 
Despite Defendant's statement in his opening brief in this matter that the Court of 
Appeals had reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to make 
more detailed findings "[a]nd to redetermine the question of whether the father had 
abandoned the child . . .", the Court actually only reversed and remanded with instructions 
to make more detailed findings. Although there is a hint in the decision that this Court "[i]s 
not all together confident that the trial court's final decision was correct. . .", there is no 
statement in the decision reversing the judgment in the case. In addition, there is no 
statement in the decision suggesting that the lower court was required to "redetermine the 
question of whether the father had abandoned the child ..." as stated by Defendant in his 
opening brief. While Plaintiff concedes that the Court of Appeals was interested in having 
the lower court review its decision, there was no mandate to reverse the judgment, and all 
that was required of the trial judge by the Court of Appeals was that he make more detailed 
Findings of Fact. 823 P.2d at 475, 479. 
The trial judge responded to the Court of Appeals' mandate on June 15, 1992, by 
entering his Amended Findings of Fact (Appendix 3). Defendant/Appellant alleges in this 
appeal that despite the numerous additional Findings of Fact made by the trial judge, said 
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Findings of Fact are still insufficient to meet the requirement of the Utah Court of Appeals 
for more detailed findings. Plainti^/Appellee argues in this appeal that the Amended 
Findings of Fact are indeed sufficient to provide a sound basis for the trial judge's 
Conclusions of Law, which were not explicitly reversed by the Court of Appeals, and its 
Judgment that Defendant had abandoned the minor child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Kim Woodward (hereinafter Plaintiff) learned she was pregnant with the minor 
child which is the subject of this action (hereafter R.A.F.) in February of 1986 (T. 95). 
2. R.A.F. was born on September 17, 1986 (T. 19). 
3. Plaintiff was married to Richard Cameron Fazzio (hereinafter Defendant) on 
November 3, 1986 (T. 19), and their marriage was annulled by the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson in Civil No. D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987 (T. 19). 
4. The Decree of Annulment provided, among other things: 
(a) Plaintiff was awarded the custody of R.A.F. subject to reasonable visitation 
rights in Defendant as agreed upon between the parties; 
(b) Defendant was ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month 
as and for child support until R.A.F. reached the age of majority; 
(c) Defendant was ordered to maintain his existing medical and dental 
insurance for the benefit of R.A.F., and each party was ordered to assume and pay one-half 
of any medical or dental costs of R.A.F. not covered by insurance; 
(d) Plaintiff was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on her income tax 
returns. (Appendix 4). 
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5. Defendant admitted that he urged Plaintiff to get an abortion when he first learned 
she was pregnant with R.A.F. (T. 585, 586). 
6. Plaintiff testified that Defendant bragged to her that he had two former girlfriends 
who had also had abortions. Plaintiff informed Defendant she beheved that abortion was 
murder and there was an argument over the subject. Plaintiff testified that there was more 
than one occasion when Defendant expressed a desire to have the child aborted (T. 20, 21). 
7. The parties had numerous separations during the course of their brief one-year 
marriage (T. 21). 
8. Plaintiff had a child from a previous marriage, Christopher Holt (DOB: 2/13/83), 
who lived with Plaintiff at the time she was married to Defendant. Christopher was 
approximately four years old during that period (T. 28). 
9. Plaintiff testified that during the course of the marriage, she and her children 
(including R.A.F.) were regularly subjected to mental and physical threats and abuse (T. 22, 
23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 151, 153, 154, 
155, 158, 183, 184, 189, 190, 191). 
10. Defendant admitted during the course of the marriage that he "smacked Kim" but 
claimed that he never hit R.A.F. (T. 499). Defendant later admitted that on occasion he 
"slapped Kim" and that he did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the child Christopher 
were out of the room when he slapped her (T. 598). 
11. Plaintiff testified that she talked Defendant into seeking marriage counseling 
during the marriage; but that not only did his abuse of her not change, he actually beat her 
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the day of the counseling because he didn't like the things she said to the counselor (T. 21, 
22, 23). 
12. Plaintiff testified that Defendant was never a parent to R.A.F. from the time he 
was born. She testified he refused to babysit the child, even though he was not working 
most of the time during their marriage. Plaintiff testified that Defendant played no part in 
the care or nurturing of R.A.F. during the one-year marriage; he would not get up at night 
with the child, he would not change a diaper, he would not feed a bottle (T. 23, 24, 25). 
13. Mr. Holt testified that his son Christopher told him during his visitations that he 
was terrified of Defendant, and that Defendant had threatened him (Christopher) with a 
knife and hit him a number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him 
Defendant at one point drove Plaintiff and Christopher out of Plaintiff's home with a gun 
and told them that if they came back, he (Defendant) would kill them (T. 151,152,153,154, 
155, 156, 157, 158). This testimony was corroborated by Plaintiff (See Fact No. 23 infra). 
14. Mr. Holt testified that when he confronted Defendant about this abuse of his son 
Christopher, Defendant responded !f[W]hile Christopher is in my house, I will treat him the 
way I want" (T. 154, 155). This testimony was corroborated by Plaintiff who described 
Defendant's attitude toward Christopher as "mean and hateful... cruel..." (T. 32). 
15. When asked on cross-examination if, during these confrontations Mr. Holt had 
with Defendant, Defendant admitted he was the father of R.A.F., Mr. Holt responded "[H]e 
neither admitted he was his father nor denied it" (T. 161). 
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16. Plaintiff testified that she discussed Darren Holt's problems with the State of 
Utah as a result of Defendant's refusal to take responsibility for R.A.F., but Defendant still 
refused to take such responsibility (T. 27). 
17. Plaintiff testified that Defendant refused to take financial responsibility for R.A.F. 
during the course of the marriage, and never gave her any money for the child in any way. 
His refusal to help support R.A.F. resulted in the child being required to wear second-hand 
items and lacking some of the necessities of life (T. 29, 30). 
18. After the parties separated for the last time, Plaintiff testified she spoke to 
Defendant many times about needing money and child support, and he refused to give her 
anything whatsoever as child support (T. 30). 
19. Plaintiff testified she never saw Defendant buy presents for the child during the 
course of the marriage or afterwards (T. 30). 
20. Plaintiff testified that Defendant did not love or nurture R.A.F. during the time 
of the marriage in any way (T. 30). 
21. The final separation of the parties came September 10, 1987, and on that date 
Defendant drove Plaintiff and her child Christopher from the marital home at gunpoint and 
took off with R.A.F. (T. 31, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55). 
22. Plaintiff testified Defendant tried to commit suicide twice during the course of 
their marriage (T. 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62). 
23. Defendant admitted he tried to commit suicide on at least one occasion (T. 595, 
596). 
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24. Plaintiff testified that on one occasion, Defendant grabbed her by the hair and 
had her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she started calling for 
Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have them call the police. Plaintiff testified 
that as soon as he moved, Defendant said lf[I]f anybody moves off that couch, 111 kill her". 
Plaintiff testified that R. A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing this 
physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Plaintiff testified that both R.A.F. 
and Christopher were terrified and they were taken by the police to the YWCA after this 
incident (T. 42, 43, 44). 
25. After these incidents of abuse, Plaintiff testified that she retained a lawyer and 
asked Defendant to accompany her to the lawyer's office to sign some papers, one provision 
of which would require him to pay child support. Plaintiff testified that he became angry 
and tore up the paper, although he later signed it (T. 63, 64, 65). 
26. Plaintiff testified that she received absolutely no child support from Defendant 
and that she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable to. She testified that even though 
Defendant's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address during this 
entire period of time, they would refuse to tell her Defendant's address so that she might 
collect child support from him. She also testified that every time she saw Defendant, she 
asked him for child support and he would always refuse to give it to her (T. 71, 72, 73, 74). 
27. Plaintiff testified that although Defendant came around four or five times from 
the date of their last separation in September of 1987 through September of 1988, he spent 
very little time with R.A.F. She also testified that after September of 1988, he never came 
to see the child at all, nor telephoned, nor contacted the child in any way (T. 75, 76,77,78). 
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28. Although she allowed Defendant's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, to see 
the child occasionally between September of 1988 and October of 1989, she gave 
Defendant's parents a note telling them that if Defendant wanted to see R.A.F., it was up 
to him to come and get him, and that she would allow Defendant's parents to see the child 
when she returned from a vacation (T. 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81). 
29. Plaintiff testified that after the visitations with Defendant's parents, she would 
always ask R.A.F. if he had seen Defendant during the visitations, and R.A.F. would say "no" 
(T. 82, 83). 
30. Plaintiff testified that after she gave Defendant's parents the note in October of 
1989, Defendant never contacted her requesting any visitation whatsoever prior to his filing 
a Petition to Modify the Decree of Annulment (T. 84). 
31. Plaintiff then sought the assistance of attorney Larry R. Keller and filed a 
Verified Petition to Terminate Parental Relationship, Rights and Duties on January 23,1990. 
32. Commissioner Sandra Peuler issued a Minute Entry Recommendation on 
February 7, 1990, later adopted by Judge Wilkinson, allowing visitation for Defendant only 
at Defendant's parents' residence, and only when Defendant was in Salt Lake for one 
weekend per month (see Appendix 5). 
33. Defendant then exercised his visitation in 1990 in the months of March, May and 
June. He failed to exercise his visitation in April, and Plaintiff testified that she received no 
notice of a requested visitation in July. The Court had required in its Minute Entry of 
February 7, 1990, that "Defendant is to provide one week's advance notice of his intent to 
visit" (T. 131, 132 Appendix 5). 
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34. Plaintiff testified that only after she filed this Petition for Termination of Parental 
Rights, did she receive checks from Richard and Steffany Fazzio, supposedly on behalf of 
Defendant, but her attorney advised her to return those checks (T. 133). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff understands the concerns of the Utah Court of Appeals in the initial appeal 
of this matter, and the reasons for remand for more detailed Findings of Fact. Plaintiff 
argues in this brief that the Honorable Olof A. Johansson's original Findings of Fact 
(Appendix 6), as supplemented by his Amended Findings of Fact dated June 15, 1992 
(Appendix 3), did indeed provide the necessary detail to support the original Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment of the Court terminating Defendant's parental rights in this matter. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot meet the burden of demonstrating that Judge 
Johansson's original Findings and Conclusions, as supported by his Amended Findings and 
Conclusions, are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous. Plaintiff submits that it would not have mattered what the 
additional Findings of Fact made by Judge Johansson in response to the directive of the 
Court of Appeals in the original appeal were, Defendant would not have been satisfied; and 
would have argued they were insufficient. This is because he totally misunderstood the 
directive of the Court of Appeals in its initial opinion regarding this matter. 
Defendant mistakenly believes and argues to this Court in this second appeal that it 
was the mandate of the Court of Appeals in its first Opinion that the trial judge reverse his 
Judgment terminating the parental rights of Defendant, and so nothing short of that result, 
and Findings of Fact supporting that result, would have satisfied Defendant. 
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Plaintiff submits that the mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals in the first appeal 
was for the Court to make "more detailed Findings of Fact" to justify its Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment in this matter. The Court of Appeals suggested that if the trial judge were 
unable to make more detailed Findings of Fact supporting its Conclusions and Judgment, 
then it should consider reversing its original decision. However, the Honorable Olof A. 
Johansson was indeed able to make more detailed Findings of Fact responding to the 
directive of the Utah Court of Appeals, and thus maintained his Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment of termination of Defendant's parental rights as originally determined. It is 
Plaintiff's position that this was a perfectly acceptable procedure pursuant to the Court of 
Appeals first opinion in this case, and the trial judge has met all requirements necessary to 
establish the fact that the Judgment should be affirmed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES AND MISUNDERSTANDS 
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN THE 
ORIGINAL APPEAL OF THIS CASE. 
Defendant, in his opening brief, has misconstrued and misunderstood the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals in the original appeal of this matter entitled Woodward v. 
Fazzio. Case No. 900626-CA, filed December 9, 1991, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Appendix 2). 
Defendant argues in his "Statement of the Issues" in his opening brief that "[H]ad the 
lower court followed the instructions regarding appropriate [sic] FINDING OF FACT, it 
could not have come to the conclusion that the Father had abandoned his child " He 
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then incorrectly states the standard of review to be a "question of law, and is reviewed for 
correctness with no deference to the lower Court's determination." (Defendant's Opening 
Br. p. xi). Further he claims "[Tjhere is no basis in any of the Findings of Fact to suggest 
that the Father destroyed the parent-child relationship. The standard of review is a question 
of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower Court's determination. 
. . ." (Defendant's Opening Br. p. x). 
Plaintiff submits that Defendant has misstated and inaccurately presented the standard 
of review in this matter. As stated in Defendant's "Statement of the Issues Presented for 
Review" in this brief, the Utah Court of Appeals made the following statement regarding a 
challenge to factual findings in a juvenile court proceeding on appeal in the case of State, 
in Interest of P.M.. 790 P.2d 562 (Utah App. 1990) as follows: 
The challenge to a factual finding must be conducted in two steps: 
(1) Appellant must first martial all of the evidence that supports 
the findings, and (2) then demonstrate to us that, despite this 
evidence, the finding is so lacking in support as to be "against the 
clear weight of evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. Doelle v. 
Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); In Re Estate of 
BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
790 P.2d at 567. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the aforementioned case was quoting standards 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in 1989 and applied to appeals from the Juvenile 
Court. See State Ex. Rel. P.H. and M.H.. 783 P.2d 565 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
There can be no question that what happened in the first appeal, and what is clearly 
happening in the second appeal by Defendant is that he is challenging the sufficiency of the 
Findings of Fact of the lower court. This being the case, the standard for review is not legal 
correctness as incorrectly stated by Defendant, but the "clearly erroneous" standard based 
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upon findings so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence.11 In 
applying this standard, the Utah Court of Appeals must provide a presumption of 
correctness to the Findings of Fact of the lower court. It seems clear, whether it be the 
Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, an appellate court in Utah will not 
substitute its own Findings of Fact for those of the trial judge who heard the evidence 
directly, observed the demeanor of the witnesses, and judged their credibility. 
The Court of Appeals made this great appellate principle clear in the case of State 
In Interest of P.H. and M.H. v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565 (Utah App. 1989): 
Moreover, we defer to the juvenile court because of its "advan-
taged position with respect to the parties and the witnesses." Rob-
ertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110,1112 (Utah 1977)... We must 
accordingly "rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that 
attends these findings". In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989). 
783 P.2d at 570. 
As Defendant argued on page 21 of his opening brief this matter, never has a case 
more clearly demonstrated why it is essential for an appellate court to defer to the Juvenile 
Court on Findings of Fact than the instant case. It is the position of Plaintiff that Defendant 
stated numerous falsehoods and committed perjury during his testimony in the trial court. 
This was demonstrated through cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses and evidence which 
could not be overcome by Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff maintains that the physical 
manner in which the Defendant and his witnesses testified in this case was as important as 
the words they used in determining their credibility. The trial judge alone was in a position 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and his determination should not be disturbed by 
this Court without a demonstration by Defendant that the Findings are against the clear 
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weight of the evidence and thus clearly erroneous. State In Interest of P.H. and M.H. v. 
Harrison, Id. 
This Court must not allow Defendant to get away with misstating and mischaracteriz-
ing the standard of review in this case as he does in his opening brief on pages xi, x, and in 
Argument No. One of his brief (pp. 1-5), Argument No. Three of his brief (pp. 12-42), and 
his Conclusion (p. 49). 
While counsel for Plaintiff respects an advocate who zealously represents his client's 
interest, it is inappropriate and bordering on misconduct for Defendant's attorney to misstate 
the standard of review on appeal of a Finding of Fact in a Juvenile Court matter. This is 
particularly true where Plaintiffs attorney is accused of causing "the lower court to blatantly 
violate (the Court of Appeals') mandate." (Defendant's Opening Br. Argument No. One pp. 
1-5). Plaintiff submits that the only reasonable interpretation of the Court of Appeals' 
decision is that the Court of Appeals was uncertain of the Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
of the trial court based upon the then-existing Findings of Fact, and remanded the case for 
"more detailed findings." Plaintiff would once again submit that if the Court of Appeals had 
intended to reverse the judgment of the trial court, it could have done so. The Court of 
Appeals could have compelled the trial judge to enter an order of judgment in favor of 
Defendant, but it clearly did not do so! Despite having reservations based upon the then-
existing Findings of Fact made by the lower court in the original proceeding, the Court of 
Appeals was suggesting that if more detailed Findings of Fact could be gleaned from the 
record so as to support the Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the lower court, then the 
Judgment may stand. However, if the lower court were unable to make the more detailed 
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Findings of Fact necessary to support its Conclusions of Law and Judgment, then it should 
reverse its decision. 
Obviously, the Honorable Olof A. Johansson determined that his Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment could be supported by more detailed Findings of Fact, and he did indeed 
create an "Amended Findings of Fact1' to supplement his original Findings of Fact for that 
purpose. Although the trial judge had the option of reversing his Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment because the more detailed Findings of Fact required by the Utah Court of 
Appeals were not available, Judge Johansson clearly rejected that approach and found that 
the more detailed Findings of Fact as required by the Court of Appeals did exist; and he so 
ruled by making his Amended Findings of Fact dated June 15, 1992 (Appendix 3). 
Applying the correct standard of review, (which is providing Judge Johansson's 
Findings with a "presumption of correctness" and requiring Defendant to meet the burden 
of showing the Court that the Findings are "clearly erroneous, i.e., . . . against the weight of 
the evidence"), the Court should then turn to the next question, which is: Did Defendant 
meet his burden? 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
SUPPLEMENTING HIS ORIGINAL FINDINGS OF FACT IN 
THIS MATTER ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF TERMINATION OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THIS CASE, 
As indicated in Point I of this brief, Plaintiff reads the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision in the first appeal as requesting the trial judge to determine if more detailed 
Findings can be made to support his Conclusions of Law and Judgment; and if not, he 
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should have reconsidered his original decision terminating Defendant's parental rights. The 
Court of Appeals determined that more detailed Findings needed to be made by the trial 
judge in paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of his original Findings of Fact in the above-entitled 
matter. Woodward v. Fazzio. supra at 478. 
The Court of Appeals noted in its Opinion on the first appeal in this matter 
ff[A]lthough the trial court's Findings of Fact constitute a full three pages of text, they 
nonetheless provide an inadequate account of the actual facts supporting the Court's 
decision.11 Woodward v. Fazzio, supra at 478. In responding to this critical observation by 
the Court, the Honorable Olof A. Johansson entered a full eight additional pages of text 
providing for no less than an additional 44 paragraphs finding separate facts in this case. 
On sheer volume alone, it must be concluded that Judge Johansson clearly attempted to 
meet the mandate of this Court by making more detailed Findings. Of course, the Court 
is not so interested in the quantity of Finding of Facts determined by the lower court as it 
is the quality of those facts, and we believe both Plaintiff and Judge Johansson understood 
this when addressing the Amended Findings of Fact issue. 
Defendant, in several places in his opening brief, seems to make much of the fact that 
the lower court judge adopted, almost verbatim in many cases, the requested additional 
Findings of Fact presented to him by PlaintifFs counsel. Interestingly enough, Defendant 
points out that Judge Johansson gave each side the opportunity to propose additional 
Findings of Fact to meet the requirements of the Court of Appeals in its Opinion in the first 
appeal in this case. As Plaintiff understands Defendant's argument, because the lower court 
judge decided to adopt many or most of the proposals made by PlaintifFs counsel, the judge 
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was in error and Plaintiffs counsel should be somehow chastised for causing "the lower court 
to blatantly violate (the Court of Appeals' mandate)." (Argument No. One Defendant's 
Opening Br. p. 1). Obviously, Judge Johansson believed that the additional detailed Findings 
of Fact submitted by Plaintiffs counsel were sufficient to meet the requirements of the Court 
of Appeals and to allow him to conclude that his original Conclusions of Law and 
Termination Order in this case were indeed justified by the facts. In fact, Defendant's 
counsel literally insults Judge Johansson by making it appear that he did not use his own 
best judgment in this case, but was somehow inappropriately or unduly influenced by 
Plaintiffs counsel. In fact, Defendant's counsel further insults Judge Johansson by claiming 
that "[t]he lower court blindly rubber stamped the parade of horribles that the mother's 
counsel submitted in his Proposed Additional Findings of Fact..." (Defendant's Opening 
Br. p. 7). Further, Defendant's counsel states "[A]ppellant submits that the lower court 
merely rubber stamped what Appellee's counsel submitted ..." (Defendant's Opening Br. 
p. 23). 
These efforts at insulting the trial court, and refusing to give the trial judge credit for 
any independent intelligence regarding this matter, is an example of the lengths to which 
Defendant will go to attempt to get this Court to substitute its judgment for that of Judge 
Johansson. Defendant submits that the record in this case is replete with these kinds of 
tactics; and frankly, such tactics have no place in a court of law. 
Defendant spends much of time arguing in his brief that it is improper for this Court 
to draw the conclusion that the matters involved in this case were matters ff[o]f credibility, 
where only the trial judge can see things mysteriously unknown to the appellate court 
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because the appellate court only has the hard, cold record ..." (Defendant's Opening Br. 
p. 3). The objective answer to the question posed by Defendant's counsel is a resounding 
yes! Credibility is a significant issue in this case and the lower court judge assessed the 
demeanor and the credibility of the witnesses carefully. Defendant spends much of his brief 
alleging that the lower court judge decided to disregard certain testimony of the father, the 
grandmother and the grandfather in this matter. Defendant is outraged by the fact that 
Judge Johansson chose to believe witnesses Ken and Barbara Kresser (the mother's in-laws 
by the mother's second marriage), Christy Tinnin, Darren Holt, Scott Ortar, and Plaintiff 
herself. 
Most of the arguments made by Defendant in his opening brief revolve around the 
fact that the lower court should have believed him and his parents and because it didn't, the 
lower court committed error. However, in response to these arguments, Judge Johansson 
made specific and detailed Findings of Fact regarding the credibility of Defendant and his 
parents. Prior to making these additional Findings of Fact, the Court stated "Although there 
was disputed evidence admitted during the course of the trial, the Court finds the following 
facts by clear and convincing evidence to be believable ..." (Appendix 3 at p. 1). The trial 
judge indeed recognized that the Utah Court of Appeals in its first Opinion in this matter 
questioned whether or not he had considered certain evidence from the mother and the 
grandparents in this case; and whether or not the Court considered the opposing evidence 
sufficiently clear and convincing to meet the standards of law required to terminate parental 
rights in the State of Utah. Judge Johansson therefore made a clear and distinct statement 
that accomplished two things: first he recognized there was contradictory evidence 
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presented by Defendant and his parents; and secondly, he recognized (as he did in his 
original Findings in this case) that he must exclude that contradictory evidence by finding 
that the evidence presented by Plaintiff and her witnesses was "clear and convincing" before 
he could terminate parental rights in this case. There is no question that the judge clearly 
recognized the standards to be used here, and also recognized the burden of proof that the 
Plaintiff had to carry in order to convince the Court it should terminate the Defendant's 
parental rights (see Appendix 3 in its entirety). 
The Court went on to make several specific and detailed findings regarding the 
credibility of the Defendant father of the child in this case in paragraph 7: 
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandpar-
ents, testified that they visited with the child on occasion between 
September of 1988 and October 1989, and although the paternal 
grandparents claimed that Respondent was present during some 
of these grandparent visitation periods, the father's testimony in 
this regard was directly impeached and the Court finds his 
testimony unreliable, untrustworthy, and unbelievable; 
t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from 
different residences as being the cause of Respondent's failure to 
visit with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the 
child to avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy 
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into 
Respondent at a truck stop in February 1989, at a time when she 
was aware Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay child 
support. Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation 
" . . . do me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, because I am 
supposed to be in Nevada."; (T. 182, 183). (Citation added). 
(Appendix 3 at pp. 2, 4). 
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The Court also made the following observations regarding the Defendant father's 
credibility in his Amended Findings of Fact paragraph 8 (see Appendix 3 at pp. 5, 
6)(Transcript page references are added and not part of the Judge's Amended Findings): 
d. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts to pay child support 
was inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable. 
Examples from the record as to Respondent's unbelievability are 
follows: 
1. Respondent claimed to have provided a car 
worth $600.00 to Petitioner in lieu of two months 
child support (T. 564, 565). However, rebuttal 
witness Scott Ortar testified that in fact Respondent 
sold the car in question to Sommers Auto Wrecking 
approximately three months after the parties' mar-
riage was annulled for $75.00 (T. 475-482). Respon-
dent admitted on cross-examination that he indeed 
sold the very same vehicle he claimed to have given 
Petitioner in lieu of child support to Sommers Auto 
Wrecking for $75.00; and further admitted that he 
did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner (T. 571, 572, 
573, 574). 
2. Related to, but in addition to the foregoing 
regarding the car, Respondent testified on direct 
examination he did not give Petitioner title to the 
1979 Mercury he was providing her in lieu of child 
support after the annulment, because he did not 
have the title. Despite this clear testimony by 
Respondent, Petitioner introduced at trial Exhibit 7 
which is a Utah Certificate of Title to the 1979 
Mercury in question and related documents. This 
exhibit clearly showed that the Utah Certificate of 
Title was issued in the name of Respondent, and 
was never in the name of Petitioner. Furthermore, 
this exhibit showed that Respondent signed the 
document as "transferor" before a notary public on 
February 5, 1988. This was the veiy date of the 
check introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 made out to 
Respondent from Sommers Auto Wrecking. More-
over, the VIN number of the vehicle on the Certif-
icate of Title and the check made out to Richard D. 
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Fazzio from Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly 
the same, and clearly establish that this was the 
same vehicle Respondent claimed to have given 
Petitioner in lieu of child support. When confronted 
with the title to the car and the check from 
Sommers Wrecking on cross-examination by Peti-
tioner's attorney, Respondent testified he wished to 
changed his testimony about not having the title to 
the vehicle and giving it to Petitioner in lieu of child 
support (T. 564, 571). 
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Annulment issued by 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No. 
D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987, Petitioner alone 
was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on her 
income tax return (Decree of Annulment paragraph 
2, Appendix 4). 
4. Although Respondent had stated on cross-
examination that he had always been truthful with 
government agencies, Petitioner's attorney on cross-
examination showed Respondent Exhibit 8 which is 
Respondent's 1987 Tax Return. Petitioner's at-
torney asked Respondent if everything reported on 
his 1987 Tax Return was true, and Respondent re-
plied it was. Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a deduction 
in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his 
failure to pay in child support (T. 580). 
5. On cross-examination, Respondent was shown 
Petitioner's Exhibit 9 which was Respondent's 1988 
Income Tax Return. Respondent admitted he paid 
no child support for 1988, but that the tax return 
showed that he was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent 
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had lived in Respon-
dent's home six months during 1988. Respondent 
admitted that that was not true and that he had 
apparently made a mistake in believing that his son, 
R.A.F., had lived in his home for six months in 1988 
when he was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his 
grandmother in Salt Lake City (T. 581, 582). 
6. The false statements made to the federal 
government on the income tax return claiming 
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R.A.F. as a dependent under circumstances where 
he did not pay child support made Respondent's 
testimony incredible and unbelievable. 
The trial judge found in his Amended Findings for paragraph 10, (see Appendix 3 at 
p. 7): 
10. Subsequent to the birth of said child, Respon-
dent had the opportunity to legally declare his 
paternity for the minor child, but he failed to do so 
in order to prevent the State of Utah or other 
persons or agencies from requiring him to meet his 
financial obligations as a parent. 
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior 
marriage, and the father of Petitioner's child Darren 
Christopher Holt, received notice in approximately 
December of 1986 from the Department of Recov-
ery Services stating he was responsible for child 
support for R.A.F. Mr. Holt testified that he ap-
proached Respondent numerous times regarding this 
situation and asked him to submit to tests or sign a 
legal document admitting to the paternity of R.A.F. 
Respondent steadfastly refused to ever sign a docu-
ment with the Department of Recovery Services 
acknowledging his paternity of R.A.F. Mr. Holt 
contacted Respondent some 14 or 15 times attempt-
ing to get him to admit to his paternity of R.A.F. 
with the State and Respondent consistently refused 
(T. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 591, 592). 
b. Although Respondent claimed he had signed a 
document upon the birth of RA.F. acknowledging 
paternity, Respondent was unable to provide a copy 
of any document, or even an identification of a 
document he had signed acknowledging paternity 
when challenged to do so at trial by Petitioner's 
counsel (T. 590, 591). The result of Respondent's 
failure to acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the 
State of Utah was that Darren Holt paid child 
support to the State of Utah's Department of 
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an obligation 
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that was rightfully that of Respondent. (Transcript 
citations added). 
Judge Johansson found then, approximately nine separate specific facts relating to the 
incredibility and unbelievability of Defendant in the trial in the lower court. In most cases, 
Defendant was directly impeached with documentary evidence or the testimony of other 
witnesses. Certainly it is true that the specific areas in which the Court found the Defendant 
to have been lying and/or intentionally misrepresenting the truth were significant in and of 
themselves; but it is also true that a trier of fact has the right to call into the question the 
whole of the testimony of any witness found to have wilfully testified falsely as to any 
material matter. Gittens v. Lundberg. 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955); J.I.F.U. § 3.12 (1957). 
Thus, it can be seen that where Judge Johansson specifically determined that Defendant had 
wilfully testified falsely on several occasions, he was at liberty under Utah law to disregard 
the whole of Defendant's testimony. He did not have to do so, but it is clear from the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Defendant's testimony was so badly impeached 
that he chose to disregard it in many areas. 
Since the Court then had every right to disregard the testimony of Defendant on any 
subject he chose, not just the subjects he was directly impeached on, Defendant's argument 
in his opening brief that the Court has disregarded or ignored his testimony is hollow and 
empty. In each case where Defendant claims his testimony was ignored or not considered, 
the Court found that there was credible, reliable and trustworthy evidence from Plaintiff or 
her witnesses. For example, Defendant argues on page 17 and 18 of his opening brief that 
he had testified regarding the number of visits he had with the minor child and how often 
he had allegedly seen the minor child. He then draws the conclusion that the Court was in 
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error in accepting the mother's testimony on direct examination and rejecting the father's 
regarding the number of visits or the frequency of the visits. Nevertheless, disregarding the 
father's testimony was the prerogative of the trial judge, given the number of material 
falsehoods testified to by the Defendant father during the course of the trial. 
In addition, Defendant attempts to impeach the Amended Finding of Fact paragraph 
7(h) and (i) in regard to the Defendant's visitation with the minor child during times when 
he was at Defendant's mother and father's home, by quoting his testimony regarding his 
having fed and diapered the child. (Defendant's Opening Br. p. 21). Again, it is the 
prerogative of the trier of fact to determine whether or not the Defendant's testimony was 
believable, and to disregard it totally if found not to be believable. 
Defendant also cites his testimony regarding visitation matters (Defendant's Opening 
Brief p. 30); child support matters (Defendant's Opening Br. p. 33); and acknowledgment 
of paternity (Defendant's Opening Brief p. 41), as examples of areas in which his own 
testimony directly contradicted the testimony of Plaintiff and her witnesses; and he complains 
the Court apparently disregarded his testimony. Again, the trial judge had every prerogative 
to disregard Defendant's testimony in light of his untruthfulness; and in doing so, if the 
Court believed the mother and her witnesses on these issues, the Court would have been 
able to find by clear and convincing evidence that the facts were as the mother testified. 
Finally with regard to the credibility of the Defendant Father, Defendant notes in his 
Opening Brief at page 33 that he was "critically injured in an automobile accident." 
Plaintiffs counsel has searched the record and is unable to see where he testified to this fact 
or how it prevented him from paying child support for over two years, and no citation to the 
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record exists. Furthermore, Defendant used as an excuse for not paying child support to the 
mother that he believed ff[a]ny monies payable would be paid to Recovery Services and not 
the mother, and that the payment or lack of payment to them did not increase or decrease 
any sums to the mother." (Defendant's Opening Brief p. 33). Apparently, Defendant 
believes that he should not have been required to pay child support to the mother if he 
knew it simply was going to go to Recovery Services and "not the mother." Such lame 
justifications for not paying his child support obligations, coupled with his outright false 
statements on numerous other occasions during the trial, led the trial judge to become 
convinced that his lamentations about efforts to see the minor child and meet his support 
obligations were consistent with his pattern of falsehoods and lies during the trial. It would 
be a terrible injustice to the mother and child in this case for this Court to substitute its 
judgment regarding the credibility of the father for that of the trial judge under circumstanc-
es where this Court could not view the demeanor of the Defendant. 
Defendant alleges that his own testimony, particularly with regard to visitation of the 
minor child, was supported and corroborated by that of his parents, Richard and Steffany 
Fazzio. With regard to the parents, it is again important to note that the trial judge was in 
the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testimony of these witnesses. He was 
also in a direct position to analyze their trustworthiness, reliability, and general credibility. 
In that regard, Judge Johansson stated in paragraph 7 (see Appendix 3 p. 2): 
j . The grandparents' testimony in regard to their son's visitations 
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great 
interest in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact 
that their testimony was impeached on several occasions. For 
instance the grandparents' willingness to exaggerate the truth 
regarding their son's contact with the child was shown by their 
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testimony regarding the court-ordered visitation occurring 
between March and the time of the trial in the instant case in 
August 1990. While suggesting that Petitioner was hard to find, 
Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner brought the child to her and 
her husband for visitation for approximately one year (T. 340, 
348, 349, 351). Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on cross-
examination that she really did not know when Respondent 
^Defendant! did or did not see R.A.F. (T. 351). Mrs. Fazzio 
admitted that she and her husband were paying the attorney's 
fees for the instant action and not Respondent (T. 350); 
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the 
child by Respondent (Defendant), but in light of the fact she 
testified her son did not pay child support because he had been 
unemployed and his earnings were low, her testimony was 
unreliable and the court believes it was the paternal grandparents 
who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few toys in question 
for R.A.F. (T. 318); 
m. Mrs Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with 
whether or not Petitioner (Plaintiff) had enough money to meet 
the basic needs of R.A.F., her grandson (T. 320, 321). Mrs. 
Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it was "a matter 
between Kim and Cameron . . . [A]nd I did not know that he was 
not providing for her. I had no need to do [sic] no that" (T. 321). 
Despite this testimony, on at least two different occasions during 
Petitioner's attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio 
admitted that she knew Respondent was not paying child support 
to Petitioner, making her testimony less credible (T. 318); 
n. Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability 
of the testimony of the paternal grandparents came during cross-
examination involving court-ordered visitation commenced in June 
of 1990, after the instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio admitted 
that she was aware that visitation with R.A.F. was to be at her 
residence by court order (T. 373). Upon cross-examination, she 
admitted that on one occasion, she and her husband left Salt Lake 
City with a boat attached to their truck, but dropped off the boat 
prior to picking up RAF. at Respondent's residence. She 
admitted that after picking up R.A.F., she and her husband went 
back and picked up the boat and went boating on Echo Reservoir 
with R.A.F. (T. 399, 400), Mrs. Fazzio stated that her boat was 
her home and so she didn't feel that she and her husband were 
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge Wilkinson's) Order 
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that visitation be at their residence (T. 400). She indicated that 
"[s]ummer weekends, our boat is our home. . . It's an overnight 
boat, it has cooking and sleeping facilities, and we live in it 
weekends11 (T. 400). However, when Mrs. Fazzio was asked how 
many weekends they had slept overnight on the boat that year, 
1990, through August 17, (the day of the trial), she admitted that 
they had not slept on the boat once that year (T. 400); 
o. Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal grandfather, agreed with 
his wife that his boat was his personal residence and their exercis-
ing visitation in June of 1990, by taking the child boating rather 
than to their home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of the 
District Court's Order (T. 468). Such testimony shows the 
incredulity and unbelievability of the paternal grandparents, 
Steffany Fazzio and Richard Bruce Fazzio; (Transcript citations 
and designation "Defendant" and "Plaintiff1 as well as emphasis 
added) (Appendix 3 at pp. 2, 3). 
Furthermore, the trial judge assessed the credibility of Richard and Steffany Fazzio 
in paragraph 8 of his Amended Findings (Appendix 3 p. 5): 
Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to get 
him to pay child support and was regularly informed by Respon-
dent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did not 
know how to contact Respondence and could not give her an 
address or telephone number for him (T. 71, 72). This Court 
finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio never knew where 
their son was so as to allow Petitioner to contact him for purposes 
of obtaining her court-ordered child support; (Transcript citations 
added). 
Given Judge Johansson's assessment of the credibility of Richard and Steffany Fazzio, 
it is clear that he had the right to also disregard the whole of their testimony, having 
believed that they testified falsely on numerous occasions during the course of the trial. 
Certainly, Judge Johansson was sympathetic with Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio and understood why 
they might come to the support of their son in this kind of action with inaccurate testimony. 
He found that their testimony was unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great 
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interest in maintaining contact with the minor child. (Finding of Fact, 1f 7 (j)). The trial 
judge believed that it was the paternal grandparents who were thoughtful enough to 
purchase the few toys presented in Court for the minor child (Finding of Fact If 7(1)). 
Furthermore, the Court found in paragraph 7(p): 
[T]he Court believes that the instant action was filed only as a 
response to Respondent's parents' concern about their own 
visitation with the child, and not their son's. 
While the trial judge and this Court should find it commendable that Mr. and Mrs. 
Fazzio have a strong desire to maintain contact with their grandchild, R.A.F., it should be 
noted that the termination in this case related to parental rights only, and not grandparents' 
rights. In fact, the grandparents chose to petition the District Court for specific visitation 
rights independent of their son, the Defendant father in this case. Furthermore, on 
November 14,1991, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson accepted a recommendation by the 
Honorable Michael S. Evans, Domestic Relations Commissioner, and entered an Order 
providing the grandparents with specific visitation rights. (See Appendix 7). No orders to 
show cause for violation of this Order have been presented to the Third District Court, and 
it is Plaintiffs understanding that these visitations have occurred as required. 
Nevertheless, despite the good intentions of the Fazzios, their inherent bias made 
them untrustworthy, unreliable and incredible as witnesses in this case, as found by Judge 
Johansson. In his opening brief, Defendant maintains that the mother's testimony, believed 
by the trial judge, should be disregarded by this Appellate Court, and the testimony of the 
Defendant's mother and father, which contradicted her, should be believed instead. He says 
this is also true with regard to the mother's statements about the father's lack of efforts to 
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visit the minor child. Mrs. Fazzio, the paternal grandmother, testified that during many of 
the occasions when she and the paternal grandfather would bring R.A.F. to their home for 
visits, the Defendant father would visit the child at that time also. However, the trial judge 
chose to believe the testimony of Plaintiff when she testified that after September 1988, and 
up to the time of the trial in August 1990, Respondent never came to see the child nor 
telephoned, nor otherwise contacted the child (T. 75). The trial court had every right to 
disregard Mrs. Fazzio's testimony, given her exaggerations and inherent incredibility. Again, 
Defendant would have this Court disregard the determinations of the trial judge with regard 
to the demeanor of witnesses and their credibility and believability and find that Defendant's 
mother was the more believable of the witnesses. This would be inappropriate for this 
Court to do in light of the standards of review regarding the presumption of correctness of 
the lower court's determination; as well as the requirement of the Defendant to show in this 
appeal that the Judge Johansson's conclusions were clearly erroneous and against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
Defendant also cites the testimony of the mother with regard to the relationship of 
the father with the child. Despite the testimony of Plaintiff that Defendant was never a 
parent to R.A.F. from the time he was born; that he refused to babysit the child, even 
though he was not working most of the time during their marriage; that Defendant played 
no part in the care or nurturing of R.A.F. during the one-year marriage; that he would not 
get up at night with the child, he would not change a diaper, and he would not feed a bottle 
(T. 23, 24, 25), Defendant argues in his opening brief that his mother (the grandmother's) 
statements regarding how he had allegedly nurtured the child and played with the child 
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should be believed over that of the Plaintiff. (Defendant's Opening Br. p. 21-23). Again, 
the believability of the witnesses was the prerogative of the trial judge, and he chose to 
believe Plaintiff and disregard the testimony of Mrs. Fazzio due to her inherent bias and 
unbelievability. 
It is clear that the trial judge was in the most advantaged position to make the 
determination to believe the witnesses, evidence and testimony presented by Plaintiff in this 
case, and to disbelieve the majority or even the whole of the testimony of the Defendant and 
his parents. The Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant had 
indeed abandoned his obligations and responsibilities to his child and that such abandonment 
led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship, and his Findings of Fact should be 
sustained and affirmed by this Court. 
POINT ffl 
ON REMAND, THE LOWER COURT ADDRESSED EACH AND 
EVERY CONCERN OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
Defendant goes through the concerns of the Court of Appeals in his opening brief and 
makes certain observations about the deficiencies of the trial judge in responding to them. 
Plaintiff will now review those concerns and show this Court where and how the trial judge 
did indeed respond. 
In its Opinion in Woodward v. Fazzio (the first appeal supra Appendix 2), the Court 
of Appeals found "conflicting11 testimony about the frequency and duration of Fazzio's visits 
with the child; his treatment of the child during those visits, Woodward's attempts to prevent 
Fazzio from visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment of child support; and Fazzio's provision 
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of gifts to the child - all facts important to the lower court's ultimate decision that Fazzio's 
conduct had destroyed the parent-child relationship. 
The Utah Court of Appeals opined that: 
[T]he trial court's findings of fact should resolve 
these conflicts unequivocally, by stating the specific 
subsidiary facts as the trial court found them. The 
findings should set forth with as much precision as 
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited the 
child during particular periods; the length of each of 
the visits; the number of visits Woodward intention-
ally prevented; the sums Fazzio provided as child 
support, either personally or through his parents; the 
number and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the child 
and the occasions on which he gave them; and the 
specific statements, acts, or omissions that demon-
strate Fazzio's intent to either accept or disregard 
his obligations a parent (e.g. instances of Defendant 
performing child care functions like changing his 
diaper or feeding him, denying that the child was his 
responsibility, etc.). 
Further, the Findings should explicitly address the 
impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on 
Fazzio's ability to maintain contact with the child, 
the effect Fazzio's living and working outside Utah 
had on his visitation, the manner and effect of any 
refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his 
paternity and any other factors bearing on whether 
Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to such an 
extent that the parent-child relationship was de-
stroyed. The Court's findings as to these issues 
should be set forth specifically and should corre-
spond to the factual evidence upon which the Court 
relied. 
823 P.2d at 478, 479. 
It is the position of the Plaintiff that the trial judge did respond to each and every one 
of these concerns of the Utah Court of Appeals as follows: 
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1. The number of times Fazzio visited the child during particular periods and the 
length of each of the visits. In paragraph 7(g), the trial court found: "Although Respondent 
came around four or five times from the date of their separation in September of 1987 
through September of 1988, he spent very little with R.A.F. After September of 1988, 
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephoned, nor contacted the child;11 (T. 75, 
76, 77, 78) (Appendix 3 p. 2 - citations added). 
The trial court also found Finding of Fact 7(h) as follows: "Petitioner would allow 
Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, to see the child occasionally between 
September of 1988 and October of 1989, as they requested. However, after the visitations 
with Respondent's parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F. if he had seen Respondent 
during the visitations and R.A.F. would say 'no';" (T. 82, 83) (Appendix 3 p. 2 - citations 
added). 
Although Defendant challenges the mother's testimony which formed the basis for 
these findings, he fails to give any specific reasons as to why the testimony should have been 
disregarded by the trial court; and why the testimony of the Defendant and Mr. and Mrs. 
Fazzio should have been believed by the trial court. Again, credibility is the key to these 
Findings of Fact, and the trial judge chose to believe the mother in this regard. As to 
Defendant's argument that the mother would not have had knowledge of whether or not the 
father visited with R.A.F. during the times the child visited with his paternal grandparents, 
the child himself denied having seen the father on these occasions. Defendant would have 
this Court disregard the statements of the child in that respect, but it seemed to the trial 
judge to be consistent with the believable evidence, and he chose to give them credibility. 
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Besides, if a minor child is questioned by his parents, and is old enough to talk and 
conceivably understand the questions, it seems unbelievable that the child would he about 
having seen his father. No evidence whatsoever was presented in the lower court to 
impeach the credibility of the mother in this regard, or to prove that the child was too young 
to really understand the questions. The mother testified that the child understood the 
questions, and that was all that mattered to the trial judge given the lack of believability of 
Defendant's witnesses. Certainly the evidence was clear and convincing in this regard and 
should not be disturbed by this Court. 
Despite Defendant's self-serving testimony that he 'Visits R.A.F. every chance he gets," 
his testimony was unbelievable and directly contradicted the testimony of Plaintiff, whom the 
trial judge found to believable. 
The trial judge made additional precise findings with regard to the number of times 
Fazzio visited and the length of those visits: 
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandpar-
ents, testified that they visited with the child on occasion between 
September of 1988 and October of 1989, and although the 
paternal grandparents claimed that Respondent was present 
during some of these grandparent visitation periods, the father's 
testimony in this regard was directly impeached and the Court 
finds his testimony unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable; 
Furthermore, in Finding of Fact 7(j) the trial judge also found: 
j. [T]he grandparents testimony in regard to their son's visitations 
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great 
interest in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact 
that their testimony was impeached on several occasions. For 
instance, the grandparents willingness to exaggerate the truth 
regarding their son's contact with the child was shown by their 
testimony regarding the court-ordered visitation occurring 
between March and the time of the trial in the instant case in 
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August 1990. While suggesting that Petitioner was hard to find, 
Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner brought the child to her and 
her husband for visitation for approximately one year (T. 340, 
348, 349, 351). Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on cross-
examination that she really did not know when Respondent did 
or did not see R.A.F. (T. 352). Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she and 
her husband were paying the attorney's fees for the instant action 
and not Respondent (T. 350). (Appendix 3 p. 2 - citations and 
emphasis added). 
Therefore, it should seem clear to this Appellate Court that the trial judge found that 
he could not determine with any reliability or credibility the number and frequency of the 
visits of Fazzio with the child due to lack of credibility of the witnesses in that regard. He 
found that the only credible testimony in this regard was that of the mother who testified 
that Defendant came around only four or five times from the date of their last separation 
in September of 1987 and through September 1988; and then never bothered to see R.A.F., 
nor telephone, nor contact the child in any way after that. Therefore, the trial judge has 
specifically and directly addressed this concern of the Court of Appeals. 
With regard to the duration or length of each of the visits, Plaintiff would submit there 
was little, if any, testimony regarding the time actually spent with the child. The only 
credible testimony in this regard resulted in Finding of Fact paragraph 7(u): 
Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered 
visitation after filing of the instant lawsuit, he did not make an 
effort to spend much time with the child during the court-ordered 
visitations. Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and 
step-father of Mark Woodward and Petitioner's present husband, 
testified that after the May 1990 court-ordered visitation with 
Respondent, he asked R.A.F. about the visitation. R.A.F. replied 
that he had gone to the park. When Mr. Kresser asked him if 
Cameron (Respondent) was there with him, R.A.F. stated "No, he 
was sleeping."; (T. 173). (Appendix 3 pp. 4, 5 - citations added). 
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While Defendant would have the Court disregard this as merely a single isolated 
incident, the trial judge, assessing the credibility and believability of the witnesses, chose not 
to disregard it and felt it was significant enough to make a detailed Finding of Fact about 
this incident. 
With regard to the quality of the visits or length of the visits, the trial judge also made 
these additional Findings in paragraph 7: 
q. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's present husband, Mark 
Woodward (T. 83). He simply did not know who is biological 
father was as a result of his biological father's failure to make any 
serious efforts to visit with him; 
r. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested 
between March of 1990 and the time of trial in this matter 
(August 1990), although there were only three occasions when 
Respondent took advantage of the opportunity to visit the child 
during this period of time. After one of these visitations, R.A.F. 
explained to Petitioner "Mom, Cameron told me he's my dad. 
He's not my dad." On another occasion, after a court-ordered 
visitation, RA.F. was asked by Petitioner who Cameron (Respon-
dent) was, and he would say that he was Brian's brother; and 
when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he would always say 
"Mark" (R.A.F.'s step-father) (T. 88); 
s. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken Kresser, the parents of 
R.A.F.'s step-father, Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has 
never mentioned Respondent or anything about his natural father, 
and that contrary to the claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not 
been taught anything by the family with regard to who his father 
is, that it is just a natural relationship and a happy family (T. 
138); (Appendix 3 p. 4 - citations added (except in 1f q.)). 
Therefore, it can readily be seen that the trial judge did indeed make specific detailed 
findings of subsidiary facts and resolved the conflicts and the evidence unequivocally. 
2. The number of visits Woodward intentionally prevented. The trial judge made the 
following detailed specific finding in this regard in paragraph 7: 
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t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from 
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to 
visit with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the 
child to avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy 
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into 
Respondent at a truck stop in February of 1989, at a time when 
she was aware Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay 
child support. Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that 
conversation f,[D]o me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, 
because I am supposed to be in Nevada."; (T. 182, 183) (Appen-
dix 3 p. 4 - citations added). 
Thus, Judge Johansson determined specifically that Defendant had failed to visit with 
the minor child intentionally; and that Defendant's desire to avoid paying child support 
motivated his lack of visitation and contact with the child. Again, it was the trial judge's 
prerogative to believe the Plaintiff in this case, and he did believe her. He also ruled that 
the evidence she presented was clear and convincing with regard to her good faith in not 
intentionally preventing Defendant from visiting with the child. 
Plaintiff would like to address one additional point made by Defendant in his opening 
brief on this subject. Defendant argues that the only way the father was going to receive 
visitation was through Court orders after Plaintiff had provided a letter (which was Exhibit 
4 during the course of the trial) which is characterized in Defendant's brief as "terminating 
all visitation with the minor child." This statement by Defendant is absolutely false! 
Appendix 8 is the note submitted by Plaintiff to Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio on one occasion after 
she voluntarily allowed the Fazzios to visit with the minor child. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY 
NOTHING IN THIS NOTE WHICH INDICATES THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO 
TERMINATE THE VISITATION OF THE GRANDPARENTS OR THE DEFENDANT 
WITH THE MINOR CHILD UNILATERALLY. That note simply discusses the problems 
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that Plaintiff observed with regard to Mr. and Mrs. Fazzios' visitation with the minor child. 
The note ends by stating "As you know, I am leaving soon and I am not sure when I will be 
back, but when both Mark and I are back, we will bring Tony to see you." It is to be noted 
here that the following exchange occurred between Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant on 
cross examination in the trial of this case regarding Defendant's Exhibit 4: 
"Q. When your parents got the note suggesting that this voluntary 
visitation they'd been given for the few months prior was going to 
be terminated (at least for awhile), why didn't you call Kim 
personally and say, Okay, maybe you don't want to give the child 
to my parents, but I want to exercise my visitation? 
A. Because I had agreed, this was an arrangement where I - we 
had agreed that my visitation would take place at my parents' 
house, being as I am out of town, in and out of town a lot. That 
way, I don't have to - I can come in, I can come in at night, I can 
sleep, I can wake up, R.A.F. can be there, I can spend the day 
with R.A.F. 
Q. Why then didn't you personally get involved and contact Kim? 
A. I was in Las Vegas. 
Q. What, you can't pick up a phone and call her from Las 
Vegas? You had her telephone number. 
A. When you don't have - not at first when I went down there 
I didn't, Mr. Keller. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you haven't called Kim and requested 
visitation yourself personally since September of 1988, isn't that 
true, Mr. Fazzio? Yes or No. 
A. Yes." 
(T. 616, 617). 
This exchange clearly shows that Defendant admitted that he had not personally called 
Plaintiff for visitation for well in excess of one year. He then admits that he made no effort 
whatsoever to contact Plaintiff for visitation between September 1988 and the court-ordered 
visitation beginning in March of 1990. This has to be the most damaging evidence of all 
against Defendant. 
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3. The sums Fazzio provided as child support, either personally or through his 
parents. With regard to this concern of the Court of Appeals, the trial judge made the 
following additional Findings in paragraph 7: 
k. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she and her husband had 
submitted child support payments to Petitioner once this termina-
tion action was filed, she claims it was on behalf of Respondent; 
however, she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three 
of the nine checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner (T. 322). 
Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that no offers were made to 
pay the child support to Petitioner until this termination action 
was filed on January 26, 1990, by Petitioner (T. 354); 
m. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with 
whether or not Petitioner had enough money to meet the basic 
needs of R.A.F., her grandson (T. 320, 321). Mrs. Fazzio 
suggested this was because she felt it was fla matter between Kim 
and Cameron . . . [A]nd I did not know that he was not providing 
for her. I had no need to do [sic know] that." Despite this 
testimony, on at least two different occasions during Petitioner's 
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she 
knew Respondent was not paying child support to Petitioner, 
making her testimony less credible (T. 318); (Appendix 3 pp. 2, 
3 - citations added). 
Furthermore, the Court went on to make a great many detailed specific Findings of 
Fact in paragraph 8 in support of the conclusion that "Respondent has paid no child support 
to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio. Due to 
space limitations, these findings will not be detailed here, and the reader is directed to 
Appendix 3 and paragraph 8 in its entirety, where Judge Johansson makes 10 very specific 
and detailed Findings of Fact regarding this issue. 
In his brief, Defendant attempts to argue that he did not pay child support to Plaintiff 
because he thought it would simply be obtained by Recovery Services and somehow he 
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believed that excused him from paying his child support (Defendant's Opening Br. at 33; T. 
556 and following). He further states that he simply was financially unable to pay child 
support and so virtually the entire allegation of Defendant that he paid some child support 
rests totally on his own credibility (which the Court has found to be non-existent) and also 
upon his justifications (which are not logical or reasonable). 
Finally on this point, a specific finding made by Judge Johansson in paragraph 8 
addresses child support allegedly provided by Defendant through his parents: 
c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition for Termination of 
Parental Rights did she receive any checks from anyone regarding 
child support. She did receive certain checks from the grandpar-
ents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, at that time, supposedly on 
behalf of Respondent, but her attorney advised her to return 
those checks (T. 133). The evidence is uncontroverted that no 
monies were ever submitted to Petitioner on a checking account 
with Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any evidence that 
Respondent had provided any money to Petitioner; (Appendix 3 
at p. 5). 
Therefore, the Court has made specific and detailed Findings of Fact with regard to 
alleged payment of child support in this case. 
4. The number and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the child and the occasions on which 
he gave them. Judge Johansson found in Finding of Fact paragraph 7 as follows: 
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the 
child by Respondent, but in light of the fact she testified her son 
did not pay child support because he had been unemployed and 
his earnings were low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court 
believes it was the paternal grandparents who were thoughtful 
enough to purchase the few toys in question for R.A.F. (T. 318). 
Again, the matter comes down to a question of the credibility of the witnesses. It is 
true, as Defendant states in his opening brief, that a few toys and trinkets were produced 
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before the Court as alleged evidence of items purchased by the father for his minor child. 
However, given the inherent lack of credibility of both the father and the paternal 
grandparents, the Court chose to disbelieve that these toys were all purchased by Defendant. 
It obviously seemed just too convenient to the judge that at the time of trial, when the 
father's relationship with the child is in question, the parents bring a few toys and trinkets 
and claim the father purchased them. There was no corroboration whatsoever for their 
testimony. Given the totality of the circumstances and evidence of this case, it was 
appropriate for the judge to make the Finding of Fact he did in regard to these few trinkets 
and toys. 
5. The specific statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazzio's intent 
to either accept or disregard his oblieations as a parent The trial judge addressed this issue 
specifically with detailed findings. In paragraph 7, the trial judge made the following 
Amended Findings of Fact: 
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an 
abortion when he first learned she was pregnant with R.A.F. 
Respondent urged Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one 
occasion (T. 20, 21, 585, 586); 
b. Respondent did not actively participate in the parenting of 
R.A.F. from the time he was born. He refused to babysit the 
child, even though he was not working most of the time during 
the parties' marriage. Respondent would not get up at night with 
the child, would not change a diaper, and would not bottle feed 
the child (T. 23, 24, 25); 
c. Respondent refused to take financial responsibility of R.A.F. 
during the course of the marriage and never gave her any money 
for the child, except as mentioned in paragraph (m) (T. 29, 30); 
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d. After the parties separated for the last time, Petitioner spoke 
to Respondent many times about needing money and child 
support, and he refused to give her any child support (T. 30); 
f. Petitioner received no child support received from Respondent 
and she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even 
though Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived 
at the same address during this entire period of time, they would 
refuse to tell her Respondent's address. When Petitioner saw 
Respondent, she asked him for child support and he refused to 
give it to her (T. 71, 72, 73, 74) (Appendix 3 pp. 1, 2 - citations 
added). 
Plaintiff could actually cite as responses to this particular concern of the Court of 
Appeals virtuaUy every single one of the 44 additional specific and detailed Findings of Fact 
made by Judge Johansson in his Amended Findings of Fact dated June 15,1992- However, 
because of space limitations and to avoid repetition, nothing more than what has been set 
out here will be presented in this portion of the brief. 
6. The impact of the relocation of the parties on Fazzio's visitation. As indicated 
previously in this brief, the detailed Amended Findings of Fact of Judge Johansson 
addressed this issue specifically in paragraph 7 as follows: 
f. Petitioner received no child support from Respondent and she 
tried constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even though 
Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the 
same address during this entire period of time, they would refuse 
to tell her Respondent's address. When Petitioner saw Respon-
dent, she asked him for child support and he refused to give it to 
her (T. 71, 72, 73, 74); 
j . [W]hile suggesting that Petitioner was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio 
admitted that Petitioner brought the child to her and her husband 
for visitation for approximately one year. Furthermore, Mrs. 
Fazzio admitted on cross-examination that she really did not know 
when Respondent did or did not see R A F (T. 340,348,349, 
350, 351, 352); 
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t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from 
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to 
visit with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the 
child to avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy 
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into 
Respondent at a truck stop in February of 1989 at a time when 
she was aware Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay 
child support. Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that 
conversation "[D]o me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, 
because I am supposed to be in Nevada" (T. 182,183) (Appendix 
3 pp. 2,4 - citations added). 
In paragraph 8, the Court made the following Findings relevant to this instruction 
from the Court of Appeals: 
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to 
get him to pay child support and was regularly informed by 
Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did 
not know how to contact Respondent and could not give her an 
address or telephone number for him (T. 71, 72). This Court 
finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio never knew where 
their son was so as to allow Petitioner to contact him for purposes 
of obtaining her court-ordered child support; (Appendix 3 p. 5 -
citations added). 
It is clear that Judge Johansson did not believe that the allegations about Plaintiffs 
moving several times during the two or three year period in question had any significant 
impact on Defendant's ability to exercise his visitation rights if he had chosen to do so. In 
fact, since the Fazzios testified that they had visitation with the child for approximately one 
year (T. 340, 348, 349, 351), it seems clear that it was not either the Plaintiffs or the 
Defendant's moving from place to place and from time to time that had an impact on the 
father's exercise of his visitation rights. He could have visited with the child if he had 
wanted to, but the Court found it believable that he had not exercised said visitation rights. 
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7. The manner and effect of anv reflisal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his 
paternity. This issue was specifically addressed by the trial judge in paragraph 10 of his 
Amended Findings of Fact. (See Appendix 3 p. 7). The entirety of paragraph 10 will not 
be set out in this portion of the brief, but the judge clearly found that f,[S]ubsequent to the 
birth of said child, Respondent had the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the 
minor child, but he failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or other persons 
or agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent." The judge 
then sets out two other specific findings in paragraph 10 which address this point. 
8. Other factors bearing on whether Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to such 
an extent that the parent-child relationship was destroyed. Again, in addressing this 
particular issue, Plaintiff is inclined to simply request that the Court review all of the 44 
additional Findings of Fact made by Judge Johansson in the Amended Findings of Fact 
dated June 15, 1992 (Appendix 2). Specifically however, the Court is asked to review the 
detailed and specific Findings of Fact in paragraph 7, subsection (b), regarding Defendant's 
failure to actively participate in the parenting of R.A.F. from the time he was born; 
paragraph 7, subsection (c), regarding his failure to take financial responsibility for R.A.F.; 
paragraph 7, subsection (e), which reads as follows: 
e. On one occasion, Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair 
and had her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor 
when she started calling for Christopher (her son from a prior 
marriage) to run over to the neighbors and have them call the 
police. As soon as he moved, Respondent said "If anybody moves 
off that couch, I'll kill her." R.A.F. was one of the two children 
present on the couch observing this physical abuse to his mother 
and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F. and Christopher were 
terrified and they were taken by the police to the YWCA after 
43 
this incident (T. 42, 43, 44) (Appendix 3 pp. 1, 8 - citations 
added). 
Although Defendant seems to make light of this situation by suggesting that the minor 
child was only a year old at the time, it is arrogant and irresponsible for Defendant to 
believe that this could not have had an effect on the minor child. Certainly, this kind of 
abuse is emotional abuse and child psychologists and scientists are just now determining what 
a large impact the viewing of such a violent and traumatic scene by a small child can have 
on the child for literally the rest of his life. To suggest that such violence does not in any 
way create a destruction of the parent-child relationship as Defendant does in his opening 
brief, is in and of itself irresponsible and indicative of his attitude toward R.A.F. 
The Court further addressed the specific point of the Court of Appeals regarding the 
destruction of the parent-child relationship in paragraph 7(g) as it relates Defendant's failure 
to spend much time with the child after the parties separated; and paragraphs 7(h), (i), (j), 
(q), (r), (s) and (u), all relating to the fact that the child simply had not seen his father 
during the course of the visitations with his grandparents. 
Certainly, the refusal of Defendant to acknowledge the paternity of his child by signing 
a simple statement to the Department of Recovery of Services as requested by witness 
Darren Holt, has to have had a bearing on the destruction of the parent-child relationship, 
simply by virtue of the father refusing to accept his responsibilities and obligations for the 
child. Paragraph 10 with its subparagraphs (a) and (b) are clear indications of this refusal 
to accept responsibility. Furthermore, the Amended Findings of Fact in paragraph 11 with 
all of its subparagraphs are clear evidence of physical abuse to Petitioner and her children, 
including R.A.F. Again, to suggest that the mere fact that Defendant "smacked Kim" when 
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R.A.F. was present could not have affected the parent-child relationship because R.A.F. was 
too small as Defendant does in his opening brief, is irresponsible and certainly not supported 
by evidence in the lower court or anywhere else. Defendant would have this Court dismiss 
what he terms as the "parade of horribles11 set out specifically and in detail by Judge 
Johansson in his Amended Findings of Fact in paragraph 11. However, Plaintiff submits that 
the violent and abusive nature of Defendant during the course of the time he lived with 
R.A.F. and the minor child's step-brother, Christopher Holt, are clear indications that 
Defendant is an unfit parent whose physical and emotional violence towards his wife and his 
children contributed to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. It remains 
uncontroverted, that no parent-child relationship exists at the present time with regard to 
Defendant and R.A.F. R.A.F. does not consider Defendant his father, as found specifically 
and in detail by Judge Johansson. In the case of State In Interest of M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 
1216 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the termination of a father's 
parental rights was supported by evidence of his failure to recognize deficiencies in his life-
style choices or parenting abilities, persistent denial of any justification for the State's 
intervention, rejection of all advice from professionals, and unpredictable behavior and 
severe mood swings. Plaintiff would argue that the instant case is similar in that Defendant 
in the lower court denied the emotionally and physical abusive activities with respect to his 
wife and the minor children under his care as a parent. Defendant, it seems, would thus not 
be amenable to treatment for these conditions. His persistent falsehoods in the trial of this 
matter are clear indications that he is a person who will say anything to support his own 
point of view, and one who refuses to recognize his deficiencies. Although the Salata case 
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involved a termination of parental rights through State action, the principal is similar to the 
instant case. 
According to Utah case law, abandonment of a child can be proven by "either 
objective evidence of the parent's conduct or by the expressed, subjective intent of the 
parent". State, In Interest of M.S. v Lochner. 815 P.2d 1325 (Utah App. 1991); In the 
Interest of J.C.O. v. Anderson. 734 P.2d 458, 462 (Utah 1987). In the instant case, the clear 
and convincing evidence of Defendant's objective conduct relative to his child convinced the 
trial court that the parent-child relationship had been destroyed; and thus the second prong 
of the test for abandonment of a child set out in State Ex Rel. Summers Children v. 
Wulffenstein. 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977) has been met in the instant case. Plaintiff submits 
there is no question that there was clear and convincing evidence in the lower court that "the 
parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for his parental obligations" to the child, 
which is the first prong of the termination test. Wulffenstein, Id. at 1159 citing State Ex. 
Rel. J.R.T. v. Timperlv. 750 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1988); Woodward v. Fazzio, supra at 477.. 
The true attitude of the father is demonstrated by his continual request in his opening 
brief in this matter for the Court of Appeals to "reverse and remand this matter once again 
to the trial court, with instructions to set out meaningful visitation with the father" 
(Defendant's Opening Br. p. 50). The father requests that this Court give him his visitation, 
but does not suggest that this Court should order that the trial court upon remand should 
order the payment of back child support, or order the father to pay child support on a 
regular and ongoing basis, or order the father to acknowledge paternity of the child officiaUy 
with agencies of the State of Utah, or order the Defendant to accept any of the other 
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obligations and responsibilities attendant to fatherhood. The Defendant in this case is the 
typical example of the "dead beat dad" who refused to accept his parental obligations. Judge 
Johansson found that his overall course of conduct with his child destroyed the parent-child 
relationship. 
A final word needs to be said about the statement of the Court of Appeals that ,![T]he 
timely assertion of such a petition (for specific visitation) is hardly the conduct of a 
disinterested parent." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 479. In light of Judge Johansson's 
Findings of Fact that it was the grandparents who desired visitation with the child (Findings 
of Fact 7(j)); that it was the grandparents who were paying for the instant action and not 
the Defendant (Finding of Fact 7); that Defendant had only reimbursed the grandparents 
for three of nine checks for child support sent to Plaintiff after this action was begun (none 
were accepted as being untimely given this litigation) (Finding of Fact 7(k)); that the Court 
believed that it was the "grandparents who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few toys 
in question for R.AJF." (Finding of Fact 7(1)); that during a court-ordered visitation in May 
1990, the grandparents took the child to a park while Defendant was sleeping (Finding of 
Fact 7(u)); the Court of Appeals needs to revisit the idea that Defendant was really 
responsible for the request for specific visitation rights. 
Judge Johansson made the most telling Finding of Fact of all on this point in 
paragraph 7(p): "The Court believes that the instant action was filed only as a response to 
Respondent's parent's concern about their own visitation with the child, and not their son's." 
(Appendix 3 p. 4). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals gave Judge Olof A. Johansson a mandate to make more 
detailed Findings of Fact supporting his Conclusions of Law and Judgment terminating the 
Defendant's parental rights in this case; or reverse his decision if he was unable to make 
such additional detailed Findings of Fact. The Honorable Olof A. Johansson has responded 
with some 44 additional Findings of Fact which clearly and convincingly show that the 
Defendant's parental rights with regard to R.A.F. should be terminated. The Defendant has 
failed to meet his burden of showing that the trial judge's Findings of Fact were "clearly 
erroneous" and "against the great weight of the evidence". Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals 
is urged by Plaintiff to affirm the lower court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree terminating Defendant's parental rights in this case. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1993. 
Attornev^or Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class 
postage prepaid, on this «3.*f day of May, 1993, to: 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 270, 2319 Foothill Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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APPENDIX 1 
their minor children and parents petitioned for Cited in State ex rel. A.H. v. Mr. & Mrs. H., 
restoration of custody on grounds of changed 716 P.2d 284 (Utah 1986). 
conditions, refusal of juvenile court to grant 
parents a hearing was an abuse of discretion. 
In re State ex rel. L.J J., 11 Utah 2d 393, 360 
P.2d 486 (1961). 
78-3a-48- Termination of parental rights — Grounds — 
Hearing — Effect of order — Placement of child 
— Voluntary petition of parent 
(1) The court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds either (a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows: 
(a) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of 
conduct or condition which is seriously detrimental to the child; 
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It is prima 
facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents, although hav-
ing legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the 
child, and for a period of six months following the surrender have not 
manifested to the child or to the person having the physical custody of the 
child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrange-
ments for the care of the child; 
(c) that after a period of trial, during which the child was left in his 
own home under protective supervision or probation, or during which the 
child was returned to live in his own home, the parent or parents substan-
tially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child 
proper parental care and protection; or 
(d) has failed to communicate via mail, telephone, or otherwise for one 
year with the child or shown the normal interest of a natural parent, 
without just cause. 
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is 
held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties 
must be advised of their right to counsel. No hearing may be held earlier than 
ten days after service of summons is completed inside or outside of the state. 
The summons must contain a statement to the effect that the rights of the 
parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceed-
ings. The statement may be made in the summons originally issued in the 
proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued. 
(3) Unless there is an appeal from the order terminating the rights of one or 
both parents, the order permanently terminates the legal parent-child rela-
tionship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental rights and 
duties, of the parent or parents involved. 
(4) Upon the entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or 
parents, the court may (a) place the child in the legal custody and guardian-
ship of a child placement agency or the department of public welfare for 
purposes of adoption, or (b) make any other disposition of the child authorized 
under Section 78-3a-39. All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption. 
(5) The parent-child relationship may be terminated upon voluntary peti-
tion of one or both parents if the court finds that the termination is in the best 
interests of the parent and the child. This termination with respect to one 
parent does not affect the rights of the other parent. 
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dant claims he should have been convicted 
and, thus, sentenced for arson rather than 
aggravated arson, as both offenses pro-
scribe the conduct for which he was con-
victed. Therefore, we find defendant's jus-
tification for our reaching his Shondel ar-
gument, raised for the first time on appeal, 
without merit. Defendant's Shondel claim 
presents neither "plain error" nor "excep-
tional circumstances" and, therefore, we 
refuse to consider it for the first time on 
appeal. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, because defendant failed to mar-
shal the evidence supporting his jury con-
viction for aggravated arson, we refuse to 
consider his claim of insufficient evidence. 
Furthermore, we decline to entertain the 
merits of defendant's Shondel claim, as he 
raises it for the first time on appeal. We, 
therefore, affirm his conviction for aggra-
vated arson. 
BENCH, PJ., and GARFF, J., concur. 
Kim (Fazzio) WOODWARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
• . 
Richard Cameron FAZZIO, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 900626-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 9, 1991. 
Father's parental rights were terminat-
ed by order of the Third District Juvenile 
"because of the clear error in the original sen-
tences." State v. Babbel 770 P.2d 987, 994 
(Utah 1989). In the later Babbel case, the defen-
dant challenged the remand sentence which was 
harsher than his original sentence. 
The later Babbel case distinguished the "cor-
rection of an illegal sentence [which] stands on 
Court, Summit County, Olaf A. Johansson, 
J., and father appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court's 
findings of fact were inadequate, and (2) 
affirmance as a matter of law was preclud-
ed, thus requiring remand, in light of dis-
puted evidence in the record. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Infants <s=>180 
"Prima facie" showing of abandon-
ment as set forth in statute concerning 
termination of parental rights may be es-
tablished only for custodial parent, but 
abandonment by noncustodial parent may 
also be established by clear and convincing 
evidence that parent's conduct evidenced a 
conscious disregard for his or her parental 
obligations to the child, and that the dis-
regard led to destruction of the parent-
child relationship. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-48. 
2. Parent and Child «=»2(8) 
There is strong presumption that child 
is better off in the care of its natural 
parents, or at least having some relation-
ship with its natural parents, and absent 
clear and convincing evidence that parent's 
disregard for his or her obligations caused 
destruction of parent-child relationship, 
presumption against termination of paren-
tal rights will govern. 
3. Trial <®=>395(5) 
Findings of fact must embody suffi-
cient detail and include enough subsidiary 
facts to clearly show the evidence on which 
they are grounded. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
4. Appeal and Error e=»1008.1(l) 
Court of Appeals will grant deference 
to fact finder only when findings of fact 
are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evi-
a different footing from the correction of an 
error in a conviction." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. 
This distinction pertains to this case because 
defendant contends not that his sentence is il-
legal but that his conviction was erroneous. 
WOODWARD 
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itiary basis for the court's decision, 
les Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
Appeal and Error <s=>757(3) 
Appellant need not go through the fu-
exercise of marshalling evidence when 
lings are so inadequate that they cannot 
meaningfully challenged as factual de-
clinations; appellant can simply argue 
legal insufficiency of the findings as 
tned. 
infants <s=>210 
Trial court's findings of fact in support 
termination of noncustodial father's pa-
tal rights were inadequate, though con-
uting three pages of text, where most 
the "findings" were conclusory and 
re akin to conclusions of law, and pro-
»d no insight into the evidentiary basis 
the trial court's decision. Rules Civ. 
c, Rule 52(a). 
Appeal and Error <3=4106(5) 
Unless record clearly and uncontro-
tedly supports trial court's decision, ab-
ce of adequate findings of fact ordinari-
equires remand for more detailed find-
s by the trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, 
e 52(a). 
nfants <£=>254 
Affirmance of noncustodial father's 
sntal rights as a matter of law was 
ossible, thus requiring remand where 
lings of fact were inadequate, where 
•e was conflicting testimony about mat-
such as frequency and duration of 
ler's visits with the child, his treatment 
he child during those visits, and custodi-
mother's attempts to prevent father 
n visiting with the child. 
v. FAZZIO 
(UtahApp. 1991) 
Utah 475 
OPINION 
)hn Walsh, Salt Lake City, for appel-
arry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for ap-
ee. 
efore JACKSON, ORME, and 
3SON, JJ. 
Such a provision is not terribly helpful to 
rties, like these, whose breakup is accompa-
ed by considerable rancor. 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant appeals the juvenile court's or-
der terminating his parental rights in his 
son. Appellant challenges the juvenile 
court's findings of fact insofar as they 
purportedly support a determination of 
abandonment. We reverse and remand for 
more detailed findings. 
FACTS 
Appellee Kim Woodward and appellant 
Richard Cameron Fazzio met in 1985 and 
began living together in August of that 
year. In September of 1986, Woodward 
gave birth to the parties' son. Three 
months later, Woodward and Fazzio partici-
pated in a marriage ceremony. However, 
at the time of the ceremony Woodward was 
already married to another man. As a 
result, when the union between Woodward 
and Fazzio was terminated, annulment was 
the method employed. The decree of an-
nulment gave Woodward custody of the 
child, subject to reasonable visitation by 
Fazzio "as the parties can agree." 1 After 
approximately two years under this ar-
rangement, during which time Fazzio 
claims Woodward repeatedly attempted to 
prevent him from contacting the child, Faz-
zio petitioned the district court to amend 
the decree to provide for specific visitation. 
Woodward responded with a petition to ter-
minate Fazzio's parental rights and a mo-
tion to transfer the same to juvenile court 
The transfer was granted, and the petition 
was heard by the juvenile court in August 
of 1990. The court granted Woodward's 
petition, ruling Fazzio's conduct constituted 
abandonment of the child. This determina-
tion was accepted by the district court. 
On appeal, Fazzio challenges the correct-
ness of four of the juvenile court's findings 
of fact2 Those findings, in pertinent part, 
provide: 
2. Fazzio sets forth three additional issues on 
appeal. These arguments are wholly without 
merit and we decline to address them. See, e.g., 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 8?6 (Utah 1989). 
% 
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(#7) Petitioner and Respondent sepa-
rated for the last time on September 10, 
1987, and Respondent has failed to make 
a serious effort to see the minor child, 
since that time. 
It is evident to the court that the natu-
ral father has abdicated his responsibility 
as a parent to said child. He has absent-
ed himself, for various and sundry rea-
sons, from the Child's life. 
His contacts with the child have been 
inconsistent, sporadic and token— 
[T]he father's contact with the child has 
been minimal and only when his parents, 
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Fazzio, the pater-
nal grandparents, had the child. 
The father testified to frequent con-
tacts and visits with the child, usually 
when in the care of the paternal grand-
parents, but, on more than one occasion, 
the father's testimony was directly im-
peached rendering his testimony less reli-
able and trustworthy. Indeed, there is 
credible and believable testimony that 
the child does not know Richard Camer-
on Fazzio as his father. 
The court is convinced that the father's 
conduct has led to the destruction of the 
parent/child relationship. 
(# 8) During the period of the parties' 
separation, and since the date of the De-
cree of Annulment (November 19, 1987) 
Respondent has paid no child support to 
Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the 
minor child. 
(# 10) Subsequent to the birth of the 
said child, Respondent had the opportuni-
ty to legally declare his paternity for the 
minor child, but he failed to do so in 
order to prevent the State of Utah or 
other persons or agencies from requiring 
him to meet his financial obligations as a 
parent 
3. Under the statute, termination is permitted by 
a clear and convincing showing of: (1) parental 
unfitness or incompetence; (2) abandonment of 
the child; (3) refusal or failure to properly care 
for the child during an at-home trial period; or 
(# 11) [Respondent] . . . was emotion-
ally abusive to the minor child, who is 
the subject of this action. 
LAW GOVERNING TERMINATION 
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987) pro-
vides the mechanism by which termination 
of parental rights may be effected. Since, 
in the instant case, the termination is based 
solely on abandonment, we begin our 
analysis by identifying the elements neces-
sary to establish that condition.3 The stat-
utory abandonment provision reads as fol-
lows: 
(1) The court may decree a termination 
of all parental rights with respect to one 
or both parents if the court finds either 
(a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows: 
(b) that the parent or parents have aban-
doned the child. It is prima facie evi-
dence of abandonment that the parent or 
parents, although having legal custody 
of the child, have surrendered physical 
custody of the child, and for a period of 
six months following the surrender have 
not manifested to the child or to the 
person having the physical custody of 
the child a firm intention to resume phys-
ical custody or to make arrangements for 
the care of the child; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987). 
[1,2] Only for a custodial parent may a 
"prima facie" showing of abandonment be 
established as set forth in subsection (b). 
State ex rel T.E. v. S.E., 761 P.2d 956, 958 
(Utah App.1988). But abandonment by a 
non-custodial parent like Fazzio, as well as 
a custodial parent, "may also be found 
where conduct on the part of the parent 
'implies a conscious disregard of the obli-
gations owed by a parent to the child, lead-
ing to the destruction of the parent-child 
relationship.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel 
(4) failure to communicate with the child for a 
period of one year, without just cause. See 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 
1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re K.S., 
737 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1987). 
nets Children v. 
331, 334 (Utah 1977)). See State ex 
R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234, 1236 
App.1988). The Wulffenstein test 
letermining abandonment in termi-
i proceedings requires proof of two 
mts. First, the party seeking termi-
n must prove that "the parent's con-
evidenced a conscious disregard for 
• her parental obligations" to the child. 
terly, 750 P.2d at 1236. Second, the 
' must demonstrate that the "dis-
•d led to the destruction of the parent-
relationship."4 Id; Wulffenstein, 
P.2d at 334. Both of these elements 
. be proven by clear and convincing 
mce. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71 
.2d 599 (1982); In re J. Children, 664 
1158, 1159 (Utah 1983). 
FINDINGS GENERALLY 
I Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.R, provides 
"[i]n all actions tried upon the facts 
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
t shall find the facts specially and state 
irately its conclusions of law there-
. ."
5
 Utah appellate courts "consist-
y stress" the importance of adequate 
dings of fact." State v. Vigil 815 P.2d 
>, 1300 (Utah App.1991). To succeed in 
lenging the findings, appellant must 
re they are clearly erroneous, i.e., 
inst the clear weight of the evidence. 
te ex rel. J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 
4, 1236 (Utah App.1988). Therefore, if 
are to determine whether the evidence 
uced at trial supports the trial court's 
lings, the findings must embody suffi-
it detail and include enough subsidiary 
ts to clearly show the evidence upon 
ich they are grounded. See Acton v. 
}iran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987); 
Hian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah 
Concern for the child's best interest is mani-
sted in the second prong of the Wulffenstein 
bandonment test: there is a strong presump-
on that a child is better off in the care of its 
atural parents, or at least having some rela-
onship with its natural parents, and absent 
lear and convincing evidence that the parent's 
disregard for his or her obligations caused a 
destruction of the parent-child relationship, the 
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Wulffenstein, 560 1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979). Absent adequate find-
ings of fact, meaningful review of a deci-
sion's evidentiary basis is virtually impossi-
ble. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 
771 (Utah App.1990). 
Fazzio, in his brief and at oral argument, 
characterized his appeal as a challenge to 
the trial court's factual findings. Accord-
ingly, he attempted to marshal the evi-
dence, as is required for such a challenge. 
See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). However, 
the marshaling effort was largely ineffec-
tual by reason of the conclusory nature of 
the trial court's findings of fact. 
[4,5] "The process of marshaling the 
evidence serves the important function of 
reminding litigants and appellate courts of 
the broad deference owed to the fact finder 
at trial." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 
(Utah App.1990). However, we will only 
grant this deference when the findings of 
fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the 
evidentiary basis for the court's decision. 
See Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 (trial court 
decision afforded no deference when find-
ings inadequate). See also Allred v. 
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 
1990) (failure to enter detailed findings con-
cerning child support determination consti-
tutes abuse of trial court's discretion). 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant 
to marshal the evidence when the findings 
are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully challenged as factual deter-
minations. In other words, the way to 
attack findings which appear to be com-
plete and which are sufficiently detailed is 
to marshal the supporting evidence and 
then demonstrate the evidence is inade-
quate to sustain such findings. But where 
the findings are not of that caliber, appel-
presumption against termination will govern. 
See In re J.R, 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982); 
In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856-57 (Utah 1981); 
State ex rel M.W.H. v. Aguilar, 794 P.2d 27, 29 
(Utah App.1990). 
5. The rule is applicable to juvenile proceedings. 
See In re N.H.B., 111 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.), 
cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
478 Utah 823 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
lant need not go through a futile marshal-
ing exercise. Rather, appellant can simply 
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's 
findings as framed. As explained in the 
next section, whatever may be said of the 
extent to which the trial court's intended 
findings lack evidentiary support, the more 
immediate problem in this case is the inade-
quacy of the findings. 
INADEQUACY OF TRIAL COURTS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
[6] Although the trial court's findings 
of fact constitute a full three pages of text, 
they nonetheless provide an inadequate ac-
count of the actual facts supporting the 
court's ultimate decision. Most of the 
"findings" are conclusory, and reflect an 
intention to merge the trial court's ultimate 
factual determinations with the require-
ments of the Wulffenstein test, and as 
such are more akin to conclusions of law. 
See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1299-1301. Finding 
of Fact # 7, for instance, states that "[ap-
pellant's] contacts with the child have been 
inconsistent, sporadic and token," that "it 
is evident to the court that the natural 
Father has abdicated his responsibility as a 
parent," and that "the court is convinced 
that the father's conduct has led to the 
destruction of the parent/child relation-
ship." These conclusory statements pro-
vide no insight into the evidentiary basis 
for the trial court's decision and render 
effective appellate review unfeasible.6 See 
Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5-6 
(Utah Ct.App.1991). The issue before the 
court was whether Fazzio had abandoned 
R.A.F.; accordingly, the findings should 
have set forth specific facts—subsidiary 
facts—bearing on that issue. The conclu-
sory statements in Findings of Fact # 7, 8, 
6. Taking, for example, the court's statement that 
appellant's contacts with the child have been 
"token," the court obviously had in mind some 
number or range of contacts appellant had with 
the child. But such a finding is problematic. 
Does the court have in mind one contact over a 
three-year period or ten contacts over a one-
year period? A reviewing court would possibly 
agree that the former is "token," but disagree 
that the latter is. However, without knowing 
what the trial court had in mind, to affirm 
10, and 11 do not provide this information 
and are therefore inadequate. 
[7] Unless the record "clearly and un-
controvertedly supports]" the trial court's 
decision, the absence of adequate finding? 
of fact ordinarily requires remand for more 
detailed findings by the trial court.7 Ac-
ton, 737 P.2d at 999. See also Lovegren. 
798 P.2d at 770-71 (remand necessary 
when facts disputed). But see State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n. 6 (Utah 
1991) (suggesting same liberalization of Ac-
ton 's requirement of express findings ever, 
absent uncontroverted evidence). 
[8] We have canvassed the record in 
the instant case and find disputed evidence, 
making affirmance as a matter of law im-
possible. Cf Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n. 
10 (absence of adequate findings is harm-
less when facts concerning an issue are 
undisputed). There was conflicting testi-
mony about the frequency and duration o: 
Fazzio's visits with the child, his treatment 
of the child during those visits, Wood-
ward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from 
visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment or 
child support, and Fazzio's provision or 
gifts to the child—all facts crucial to the 
validity of the court's ultimate decision that 
Fazzio's conduct had destroyed the parent 
child relationship. See Adams, 821 P.2d at 
6 ("When multiple conflicting versions of 
the facts create a matrix of possible factual 
findings, we are unable on appeal to as-
sume that any given finding was in fact 
made."). 
The trial court's findings of fact should 
resolve these conflicts unequivocally, by 
stating the specific subsidiary facts as the 
trial court found them. The finding? 
should set forth, with as much precision as 
possible, the number of times Fazzio visiteu 
the child during particular periods; the 
would be to defer to the court's legal conclusion. 
as though a matter of fact, without being able tc 
evaluate its correctness against particular facts 
7. Otherwise, this court would be placed in the 
awkward position of having to speculate abou: 
what the court actually determined the facts to 
be, without benefit of the guidance that proper 
factual findings are meant to provide. 
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of each of the visits; the number of 
Woodward intentionally prevented; 
ms Fazzio provided as child support, 
personally or through his parents; 
mber and type of gifts Fazzio gave 
child and the occasions on which he 
them; and the specific statements, 
>r omissions that demonstrate Faz-
itent to either accept or disregard his 
-ions as a parent (e.g., instances of 
int performing child care functions 
langing his diaper or feeding him, 
g that the child was his responsibili-
.). 
iier, the findings should explicitly 
s the impact Woodward's frequent 
;ion had on Fazzio's ability to main-
intact with the child,8 the effect Faz-
iving and working outside Utah had 
visitation,9 the manner and effect of 
ifusal on Fazzio's part to legally ac-
3dge his paternity, and any other 
3 bearing on whether Fazzio con-
ly disregarded the child to such an 
that the parent-child relationship 
jstroyed.10 The court's findings as to 
issues should be set forth specifically 
hould correspond to the factual evi-
upon which the court relied. 
e we possess this information, we can 
ngfully evaluate whether the visits 
>een sporadic, the child support pay-
insufficient, Fazzio's conduct unac-
>le, and, ultimately, whether Fazzio 
oned the child. Accordingly, we re 
for more detailed findings by the 
ourt 
i do not intend our remand to be 
y an exercise in bolstering and sup-
g the conclusion already reached." 
* v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 
This court is not altogether confi-
hat the trial court's final decision was 
i record indicates that from the time the 
ee of annulment was entered until trial, 
dward had moved in with her mother, then 
her own apartment, then to Coalville, 
igville, Riverton, West Jordan, and back to 
ville. 
e record indicates Fazzio was employed in 
ming and Nevada for periods of time after 
decree was entered and maintained resi-
t s in those states. 
correct, particularly since the action to ter-
minate Fazzio's parental rights was com-
menced by Woodward in response to Faz-
zio's petition for specific visitation. The 
timely assertion of such a petition by Faz-
zio is hardly the conduct of a disinterested 
parent 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
RUSSON, J., concurs in the result 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
LeBARON & ASSOCIATES, 
INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
REBEL ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
NEC INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 910120-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1991. 
Manufacturer, by third-party counter-
claim, asserted contract action to recover 
from dealer money allegedly owed under 
authorized dealer agreement. Judgment 
for manufacturer was entered by the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J., and dealer appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ., 
10. For example, the court seems to have dis-
counted visits Fazzio had with his son while the 
son was in the company of Fazzio's parents. 
Especially given the animosity between Wood-
ward and Fazzio, and Woodward's apparent 
preference for dealing with Fazzio's parents, no 
reason immediately suggests itself for why Faz-
zio's visits with the child during time the child 
spent with his paternal grandparents should not 
"count" in Fazzio's favor. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
:-i a k±3 » £**• 
JUN 1 5 1992 
STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest: 
of 
FAZZIO, RICHARD ANTHONY 
(09/17/86) 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT >»cr-~ 
JUVENILE COURT ^ /w -oft 
Case No.: 786412 
WOODWARD, KIM (FAZZIO) 
vs. 
FAZZIO, RICHARD CAMERON 
- Petitioner 
- Respondent : 
ORDER 
: DISTRICT COURT 
Case No: 87-37986 
Upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals this Court submits the 
following supplemental and amended detailed findings in support of its order 
entered on November 28, 1990. 
Paragraph 7. Although there was disputed evidence admitted during the 
course of the trial, the Court finds the following facts by clear and 
convincing evidence to be believable: 
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an abortion 
when he first learned she was pregnant with R.A.F.. Respondent urged 
Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one occasion; 
b. Respondent did not actively participate in the parenting of R.A.F. 
from the time he was born. He refused to babysit the child, even though 
he was not working most of the time during the parties1 marriage. 
Respondent would not get up at night with the child, would not change a 
diaper, and would not bottle feed the child; 
c. Respondent refused to take financial responsibility for R.A.F., 
during the course of the marriage and never gave her any money for the 
child, except as mentioned in paragraph (m); 
d. After the parties separated for the last time, Petitioner spoke to 
Respondent many times about needing money and child support, and he 
refused to give her any child support; 
e. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had 
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she 
started calling for Christopher (her son from a prior marriage) to run 
over to the neighbors and have them call the police. As soon as he 
moved. Respondent said'(I)f anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill 
her.1 R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing 
this physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both 
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they were taken to the police 
to the YWCA after this incident; 
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f. Petitioner received no child support from Respondent and she tried 
constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even though Respondent's 
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address during 
this entire period of time, they would refuse to tell her Respondent's 
address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked him for child 
support and he refused to give it to her; 
g. Although Respondent came around four or five times from the date of 
their separation in September of 1987, through September of 1988, he 
spent very little time with R.A.F.. After September of 1988, 
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephone, nor contacted the 
child; 
h. Petitioner would allow respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany 
Fazzio, to see the child occasionally between September of 1988 and 
October of 1989, as they requested. However, after the visitations 
with Respondent's parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F., if he 
had seen Respondent during the visitations, and R.A.F., would say "no"; 
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, 
testified that they visited with the child on occasion between 
September of 1988 and October 1989, and although the paternal 
grandparents claimed that Respondent was present during some of these 
grandparent visitation periods, the father's testimony in this regard 
was directly impeached and the Court finds his testimony unreliable/ 
untrustworthy and unbelievable; 
j. The grandparents' testimony in regard to their son's visitations 
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great interest 
in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact that their 
testimony was impeached on several occasions. For instance, the 
grandparents' willingness to exaggerate the truth regarding their son's 
contact with the child was shown by their testimony regarding the 
court-ordered visitation occurring between March and the time of the 
trial in the instant case in August 1990. While suggesting that 
Petitioner was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner 
brought the child to her and her husband for visitation for 
approximately one year. Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on 
cross-examination that she really did not know when Respondent did or 
did not see R.A.F.. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she and her husband were 
paying the attorney's fees for the instant action and not Respondent; 
k. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she and her husband had 
submitted child support payments to Petitioner once this termination 
action was filed, she claims it was on behalf of Respondent; however, 
she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three of the nine 
checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner. Furthermore, Mrs. 
Fazzio admitted that no offers were made to pay the child support to 
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Petitioner until this termination action was filed on January 26, 1990/ 
by Petitioner; 
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the child 
by Respondent, but in light of the fact she testified her son did not 
pay child support because he had been unemployed and his earnings were 
low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court believes it was the 
paternal grandparents who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few 
toys in question for R.A.F.; 
m. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with whether 
or not Petitioner had enough money to meet: the basic needs of R.A.F., 
her grandson. Mrs. Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it was 
*a matter between Kim and Cameron.... (A)nd I did not know he was not 
providing for her. I had no need to do (sic know) that.1 Despite this 
testimony, on at least two different occasions during Petitioner's 
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she knew 
Respondent was not paying child support to Petitioner, making her 
testimony less credible; 
n. Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability of 
the testimony of the paternal grandparents came during 
cross-examination involving court-ordered visitation commenced in June 
of 1990, after the instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio admitted 
that she was aware that visitation with R.A.F. was to be at her 
residence by court order. Upon cross-examination, she admitted that on 
one occasion she and her husband left Salt Lake City with a boat 
attached to their truck, but dropped off the boat prior to picking up 
R.A.F. at Petitioner's residence. She admitted that after picking up 
R.A.F., she and her husband went back and picked up the boat and went 
boating on Echo Reservoir with R.A.F., Mrs. Fazzio stated that her boat 
was her home and so she didn't feel that she and her husband were 
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge Wilkinson's) Order that 
visitation be at their residence. She indicated that '. • • summer 
weekends, our boat is our home. • • It's an overnight boat, it has 
cooking and sleeping facilities, and we live in it weekends. ' However, 
when Mrs. Fazzio was asked how many weekends they had slept overnight 
on the boat that year, 1990, through August 17 (the day of the trial), 
she admitted that they had not slept on the boat once that year); 
o. Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal grandfather, agreed with his 
wife that his boat was his personal residence and their exercising 
visitation in June of 1990, by taking the child boating rather than to 
their home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of the District 
Court's Order. Such testimony shows the incredulity and 
unbelievability of the paternal grandparents, Steffany Fazzio and 
Richard Bruce Fazzio; 
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p. Petitioner gave Respondent's parents a note in October of 1989, 
indicating that she was going on vacation and she would allow them to 
see the child later. It was immediately after receiving this note at a 
time of expected visitation, that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio retained an 
attorney and filed the Petition for Modification on behalf of their 
son, the Respondent. The Court believes that the instant action was 
filed only as a response to Responsent' s parents' concern about their 
own visitation with the child, and not their son's; 
g. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's present husband, Mark 
Woodward (T. 83). He simply did not know who his biological father was 
as a result of his biological father's failure to make any serious 
efforts to visit with him; 
r. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested between 
March of 1990 and the time of trial in this matter (August 1990), 
although there were only three occasions when Respondent took advantage 
of the opportunity to visit the child during this period of time. 
After one of these visitations, R.A.F. exclaimed to Petitioner 'Mom, 
Cameron told me he's my dad. He's not my dad.' On another occasion 
after a court-ordered visitation, R.A.F. was asked by Petitioner who 
Cameron (Respondent) was, and he would say that he was Brian's brother; 
and when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he would always say 
'Mark' (R.A.F.'s stepfather); 
s. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken Kresser, the parents of R.A.F.'s 
stepfather, Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has never mentioned 
Respondent or anything about his natural father, and that contrary to 
the claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not been taught anything by 
the family with regard to who his father is, that it is just a natural 
relationship and a happy family; 
t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from 
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to visit 
with the child. Respondent failed to have contact with the child to 
avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy Tinnin, 
Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into Respondent at 
a truck stop in February of 1989, at a time when she was aware 
Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay child support. 
Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation '• • . do me a 
favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, because I am supposed to be in 
Nevada.'; 
u. Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered visitation 
after the filing of the instant lawsuit, he did not make an effort to 
spend much time with the child during the court-ordered visitations. 
Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and step-father of Mark 
Woodward and Petitioner's present husband, testified that after the May 
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1990, court-ordered visitation with Respondent, he asked R.A.F. about 
the visitation. R.A.F. replied that he had gone to the park. When Mr. 
Kresser asked him if Cameron (Respondent:) was there with him, R.A.F. 
stated 'no, he was sleeping.'; 
Paragraph 8. During the period of the parties' separation, and since 
the date of the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987), Respondent has paid 
no child support to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child. 
Richard Anthony Fazzio. 
a. The testimony was clear at the trial that Respondent owed to 
Petitioner some $3,000.00 in back child support at the time of trial in 
this matter; 
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to get 
him to pay child support and was regularly informed by Respondent's 
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did not know how to 
contact Respondent and could not give her an address or telephone 
number for him. This Court finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. 
Fazzio never knew where their son was so as to allow Petitioner to 
contact him for purposes of obtaining her court-ordered child support; 
c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition for Termination of 
Parental Rights did she receive any checks from anyone regarding child 
support. She did receive certain checks from the grandparents, Richard 
and Steffany Fazzio, at that time, supposedly on behalf of Respondent, 
but her attorney advised her to return those checks. The evidence is 
uncontroverted that no monies were ever submitted to Petitioner on a 
checking account with Respondent's on a checking account with 
Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any evidence that Respondent 
had provided any money to Petitioner; 
d. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts to pay child support was 
inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable. Examples from 
the record are follows: 
1. Respondent claimed to have provided a car worth $600.00 to 
Petitioner in lieu of two months child support. However, 
rebuttal witness Scott Ortar testified that in fact Respondent 
sold the car in question to Sommers Auto Wrecking approximately 
three months after the parties' marriage was annulled for 
$75.00. Respondent admitted on cross-examination that he indeed 
sold the very same vehicle he claimed to have given Petitioner in 
lieu of child support to Sommers Auto Wrecking for $75.00, and 
further admitted that he did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner; 
2. Related to, but in addition to the foregoing regarding the 
car, Respondent testified on direct examination he did not give 
Petitioner title to the 1979 Mercury he was providing her in lieu 
AMENDED FIWDiwuo uc *«%.* 
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of child support after the annulment, because he did not have the 
title. Despite this testimony by Respondent, Petitioner 
introduced at trial Exhibit 7 which is a Utah Certificate of 
Title to the 1979 Mercury in question and related documents. 
This exhibit showed that the Utah Certificate of Title was issued 
in the name of Respondent, and was never in the name of 
Petitioner. Furthermore, this exhibit showed that Respondent 
signed the document as "transferor" before a notary public on 
February 5, 1988. This was the very date of the check introduced 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 made out to Respondent from Sommers Auto 
Wrecking. Moreover, the VIN number of the vehicle on the 
Certificate of Title and the check made out to Richard D. Fazzio 
from Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly the same, and clearly 
establish that this was the same vehicle Respondent claimed to 
have given Petitioner in lieu of child support. When confronted 
with the title to the car and the check from Sommers wrecking on 
cross-examination by Petitioner's attorney, Respondent testified 
he wished to change his testimony about not having the title to 
the vehicle and giving it to Petitioner in lieu of child support; 
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Annulment issued by the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987, 
Petitioner alone was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on 
her income tax return; 
4. Although Respondent had stated on cross-examination that he 
had always been truthful with government agencies, Petitioner's 
attorney on cross-examination showed Respondent Exhibit 8 which 
is Respondent's 1987 Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney asked 
Respondent if everything reported on his 1987 Tax return was 
true, and Respondent replied it was. Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a 
deduction in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his 
failure to pay child support; 
5. On cross-examination. Respondent was shown Petitioner's 
Exhibit 9 which was Respondent's 1988 Income Tax Return. 
Respondent admitted he paid no child support for 1988, but that 
the tax return showed that he was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent 
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had lived in Respondent's home six 
months during 1988. Respondent admitted that that was not true 
and that he had apparently made a mistake in believing that his 
son, R.A.F., had lived in his home for six months in 1988 when he 
was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his grandmother in Salt 
Lake City; 
6. The false statements made to the federal government on the 
income tax return claiming R.A.F. as a dependent under 
circumstances where he did not pay child support made 
Respondent's testimony incredible and unbelievable. 
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Paragraph 10. Subsequent to the birth of said child. Respondent had 
the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the minor child, but he 
failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or other persons or 
agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent. 
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior marriage, and the 
father of Petitioner's child Darren Christopher Holt, received notice 
in approximately December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery 
Services stating he was responsible for child support for R.A.F.. Mr. 
Holt 
testified that he approched Respondent numerous times regarding this 
situation and asked him to submit to tests or sign a legal document 
admitting to the paternity of R.A.F. Respondent steadfastly refused to 
ever sign a document with the Department of Recovery Services 
acknowledging his paternity of R.A.F.. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent 
some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to his paternity of 
R.A.F. with the State and Respondent consistently refused; 
b. Although Respondent claimed he had signed a document upon the birth 
of R.A.F. acknowledging paternity, Respondent was unable to provide a 
copy of any document, or even an identification of a document he had 
signed acknowledging paternity when challenged to do so at trial by 
Petitioner's counsel. The result of Respondent's failure to 
acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the State of Utah was that 
Darren Holt paid child support to the State of Utah's Department of 
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an obligation that was 
rightfully that of the Respondent. 
Paragraph 11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this 
case, there is evidence that during the period of time that Petitioner and 
Respondent lived together, Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally 
to Petitioner, to Petitioner's minor child from a former marriage, and was 
emotionally abusive to the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the 
subject of this action. 
a. Petitioner had a child from a previous marriage, Darren Christopher 
Holt (DOB: 2/13/83), who lived with Petitioner at the time she was 
married to Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years old 
during that period; 
b. During the course of the marriage. Petitioner and her children, 
including R.A.F., were regularly subjected to mental and physical 
threats and abuse by Respondent; 
c. Respondent admitted during the course of the marriage that he 
"smacked Kim" and that he did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the 
child Christopher were out of the room when he slapped her; 
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d. Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage counseling 
during the marriage; but not only did his abuse of her not change, 
Respondent actually beat her the day of counseling because he didn't 
like the things she said to the counselor; 
e. Darren Holt testified that his son, Christopher, told him during 
his visitations that he was terrified of Respondent, and that 
Respondent had threatened him (Christopher) with a knife and hit him a 
number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him 
Respondent at one point drove Petitioner and Christopher out of 
Petitioner's horn* with a gun and told them that if they came back, he 
(Respondent) would kill them. This testimony was corroborated by 
Petitioner; 
f. When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent about this abuse of his son, 
Christopher, Respondent replied". . . While Christopher is in my house, 
I will treat him the way I want." this testimony was corroborated by 
Petitioner who described respondent's attitude toward Christopher as 
"mean and hateful . . . cruel. . .; 
g. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had 
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she 
started calling for Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have 
them call the police. Petitioner testified that as Christopher moved, 
Respondent said M(I)if anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her." 
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing this 
physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F. 
and Christopher were terrified and they were taken by the police to the 
YWCA after this incident. 
Dated this 15th day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Sf&c. Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
•Mr'. John Walsh, Esq. 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 
Suite 202 - Cove Point Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
xtftah Court of Appeals 
No. 900626CA 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIM FAZZIO, 
Plaintiff 
RICHARD CAMERON FAZZIO, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF ANNULMENT 
Civil No. D-87-3798 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above action came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge, on Friday, November 
13, 1987. The Plaintiff appeared with her counsel, Elliott 
Levine. The Defendant appeared in person without counsel. 
Defendant filed his Acknowledgement that he had been served with 
a copy of the Complaint and waived service of process; said 
Defendant also consented that default may be entered against him 
.andfoiEhafci^ thla^ jna11eT.^ may1Tt^ e_^ theard_on_tfre Comp 1 aint of the 
Plaintiff" without further.notice.to, Defendant. 
Upon entry of the default of the Defendant and the 
taking of the proofs of the Plaintiff and made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the marriage ceremony entered into between the 
parties on November 3 , 1986, is hereby, declared to be null and 
void and of no force or effect. 
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2. Plaintiff is awarded of the minor child of the 
parties, RICHARD ANTHONY, subject to reasonable visitation rights 
in the Defendant as agreed upon between the parties* Defendant is 
ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month as 
and for child support until said child reaches the age of 
majority. Defendant is ordered to maintain his existing medical 
and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child of the 
parties. Each party is ordered to assume and pay one half (1/2) 
of any medical or dental costs of the minor child not covered by 
insurance. Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child 
of the parties as a dependant on her income tax returns. 
3. The marital property is awarded to the party having 
possession of the same. 
4. The parties are ordered to assume and pay all 
marital debts pursuant to agreement. Each party is ordered to 
assume and pay any debts or obligations incurred by themselves 
after the filing of this action, and hold the other party 
harmless therefrom. 
5. No alimony is awarded to either party. 
6. Defendant is ordered to maintain Plaintiff and her 
minor children by a prior marriage on his existing medical 
insurance until Plaintiff remarries. 
7* The Court hereby authories the withholding of 
income as a means of collecting any child support ordered by the 
Court in this Decree. It is further ordered that when child 
support is delinquent, as defined by Subsection 78-45d-l(4), Utah 
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APPENDIX 5 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAZZIO, KIM 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
FAZZIO, RICHARD CAMERON 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 874903798 DA 
DATE 02/03/90 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
COURT REPORTER WRITTEN NO TAPE 
COURT CLERK SPO 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. KELLER, LARRY R. 
D. ATTY. WALSH, JOHN 
ON MOTION OF 
PLTF & DEFT 
COMM. RECOMMENDS: 
1. THAT PLTF'S MOTION TO TRANSFER THE ISSUE OF VISITATION TO 
JUVENILE COURT BE DENIED. 
2. THAT ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, DEFT'S REASONABLE VISITATION BE 
DEFINED AS FOLLOWS: ONE WEEKEND PER MONTH, SATURDAY 10:00 
A.M. - 5 P.M. AND SUNDAY 10:00 A.M. - 5 P.M., TO BE 
EXERCISED AT DEFT'S PARENT'S RESIDENCE. FURTHER, THAT 
DEFT BE RESPONSIBLE TO TRANSPORT THE CHILD FOR VISITATION. 
THIS VISITATION IS TO BE EXERCISED ONLY WHEN THE DEFT IS 
IN SALT LAKE, AND UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE, IS 
TO BE THE THIRD WEEKEND OF EACH MONTH, BEGINNING IN 
FEBRUARY, 1990. DEFT IS TO PROVIDE 1 WEEK ADVANCE NOTICE OF 
HIS INTENT TO VISIT. 
3. THAT BOTH PARTIES BE PERMANENTLY ENJOINED, PERSONALLY 
OR THROUGH AGENTS, FROM HARASSING, ANNOYING, OR THREATENING 
THE OTHER. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: AND DECREE 
FAZZIO, RICHARD ANTHONY : 
DOB: September 17, 1986 : CASE NO. 786412 
: Judge Olof A. Johansson 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on August 16, 
17, and 28, 1990, with Petitioner Kim Woodward being present and represented 
by her attorney, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and Respondent Richard Cameron 
Fazzio being present and represented by his attorney, John Walsh, Esq. The 
Court, after receiving evidence from the parties and their witnesses, 
hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing the exhibits and such memoranda 
of counsel as submitted, and good cause appearing herein enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner Kim (Fazzio) Woodward and the minor child, Richard 
Anthony Fazzio, the subject of this action, are residents of Summit County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Respondent Richard Cameron Fazzio is a resident of Clark County, 
State of Nevada. 
3. Petitioner and Respondent were married on November 3, 1986. 
4. Subsequent to the marriage, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson of the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
issued a Decree of Annulment of said marriage dated November 19, 1987. 
5. As a result of the union of Petitioner and Respondent, a single 
child was born, Richard Anthony Fazzio, date of birth, September 17, 1986. 
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6. Petitioner has subsequently remarried, and Petitioner's name is r.c 
Kim Woodward. 
7. Petitioner and Respondent separated for the last time on 
approximately September 10, 1987, and Respondent has failed to make a 
serious effort to see the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio since that 
time. 
It is evident to the Court that the natural father has abdicated his 
responsibility as a parent to said child. He has absented himself, for 
various and sundry reasons, from this child's life. 
His contacts with the child have been inconsistent, sporadic and token. 
Except for time periods early in the child's life, the father's contact wit 
the child has been minimal and only when his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Richard 
Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, had the child. It appears to be a 
relationship of convenience for the father. The Court has observed no firn: 
intent or manifestation from the conduct of the father that he was serious 
about establishing a meaningful parent/child relationship or to resume care 
of the child. 
The father testified to frequent contacts and visits with the cild, 
usually when in the care of the paternal grandparents, but, on more than cm 
occasion, the father's testimony was directly impeached rendering his 
testimony less reliable and trustworthy. Indeed, there is credible and 
believable testimony that the child does not know Richard Cameron Fazzio as 
his father. 
-3-
The record reflects significant investment of time, love, inceresc, and 
concern for the child by the paternal grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Richard 
Fazzio. But their altruistic efforts cannot be ascribed to the father, as 
the Court must look to the father's conduct alone in reaching its judgment. 
The Court is rnTyirfti<y_4 tj\4C ^ a f^ Ch*r'<? conduct has led to the destruction 
of the parent/child relationship. 
8. During the period of the parties' separation, and since the date of 
the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987), Respondent has paid no child 
support to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child, Richard 
AntKohy Fazzio. 
9. Petitioner attempted to locate and contact Respondent since the data 
of the parties' annulment so that she might collect child support, but she 
was unsuccessful in locating him. 
10. Subsequent to the birth of said child, Respondent had the 
opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the minor child, but he 
failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or otiier persons or 
agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent. 
11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this case, there is 
evidence that during the period of time that Petitioner and Respondent lived 
together, Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally to Petitioner, 
to Petitioner's minor child from a former marriage, and was emotionally 
abusive to the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the subject of 
this action. 
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Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV 
1. Respondent Richard Cameron Fazzio's overall conduct constitutes a 
"conscious disregard" of the parental obligation to the child, 
2. Such "conscious disregard" of the parental obligation to the child 
has led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship between 
Respondent and the minor child. 
3. Therefore, the -linor child has been abandoned by his natural father 
within the purview of the requirements of U.C.A. 78-3a-48 of the Juvenile 
Court Act, and subsequent Utah Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions 
interpreting said statute. 
4. The trial held in this case met the requirements of U.C.A. 
78-3a-48(2) as a "hearing held specifically on the question of terminating 
the rights of the parent," Richard Cameron Fazzio. 
5. Richard Cameron Fazzio was properly represented by competent legal 
counsel and present during all proceedings conducted herein. 
In viewing the totality of the circumstances, and based upon the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a careful review of the evidence, 
the exhibits and the arguments of Counsel, the Court is convinced by clear 
and convincing evidence that said child has been legally abandoned by his 
father, and therefore, enters the following decree: 
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DECREE 
1. It is hereby Ordered that the parental rights of Richard Cameron 
Fazzio, as to said minor child, are hereby permanently terminated including 
any and all residual parental rights, 
2. The decision of this Court does not rest upon U.C.A. 78-30-5, as 
this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under that 
Section. 
3. It is further directed that Mr. Larry Keller, counsel for 
Petitioner, file a certified copy of this Order and the Interim Order of 
October 1, 1990 with the District Court in Case No. 874903798DA, Kira Fazzio 
v. Richard Cameron Fazzio. 
BY THE COURT, 
HOI^kABLE/OL0# A. JOHANSSON 
" • IV.'lZ • - -r ^ - 1 -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
KI?i (FAZZIO) WOODWARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD CAMERON FAZZIO 
Defendant. 
ooooOoooo 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 87-3798 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The Intervenors, Richard Bruce Fazzio and Steffany J. 
Fazzio, Ilotion for Temporary Order re: Visitation, came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Michael Evans, 
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on Tuesday, September 10, 
1991, at the hour of 2:00 P.M., with the Plaintiff Kim Fazzio 
Woodward appearing and represented by Larry R. Keller, Attorney 
at Law, and the Intervenors, Richard Bruce Fazzio, and Steffany 
J. Fazzio, appearing and represented by John Walsh, Attorney 
at Law, and the Court after reviewing the file, the affidavits, 
exhibits, etc., and being fully advised as to the facts and 
circumstances, and then after hearing argument of Counsel on 
all the following issues, anci otherwise for good cause anpearing, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That there is no legal basis to conclude that the 
rights of the Grandparents to visit the subject child and to 
otherwise have a meaningful relationship with the subject 
child, arei foreclosed by virtue of the fact that the Juvenile 
Court has entered an order terminating the parental right of 
Richard Cameron Fazzio. 
2. That as a matter of law, the Grandparents are 
entitled to liberal and meaningful visitation with the minor 
child as is in the best interest of the minor child, 
3. That the Juvenile Court made a specific finding 
regarding the Paternal Grandparents of a minor child, Interveners 
herein, as follows: ,?The record reflects significant invest-
ment of time, love, interest, and concern for the child by the 
paternal grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Fazzio.M 
4. That it is in the best interest of the minor child 
that the Intervenors be granted liberal and meaningful visita-
tion on a temporary basis as follows with no restriction as to 
where the said visitation is to occur: 
a. Saturday, September 2S, 1991, from the hours 
of 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. 
b. Saturday and Sunday, October 5 and October 6, 1991, 
from the hours! of 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. each day. 
c. Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, October 18 through 
October 20, 1991, from Friday at 6:00 P.M. to and including 
Sunday at 6:00 P.M. and every third weekend of each month 
thereafter. 
The picking up and delivering back of the minor 
child shall occur as the parties can resolve amongst themselves. 
That the foregoing is a Temporary Order, until the 
relationship with the minor child has been re-established. 
5. The Plaintiff's Motion for a Change of Venue is 
hereby denied. 
6. The Plaintiff's Motion to Certify this matter to 
the Juvenile Court is hereby denied. 
7. The Plaintiff's Motion for child support is hereby 
denied, as there is no legal basis to require grandparents to 
pay child support or grandchild support. 
8. On a temporary basis, Intervenors, until further 
order of this court, shall not allow visitation between the 
Defendant, Richard Cameron Fazzio, and the minor child, Richard 
Anthony fazzio, born September 17, 1986. 
Each side is to bear their own costs and attorneys fees 
associated with this action. 
Dated t h i s / * / day of October, 1991 044 
<;*i^~ 
BY THE COURT: 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS 08 A TRUE CO 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT fin ^L2 -N 
DISTRICT COURT.3AtTlAK2CaWTV 
UTAH. 
DATE &%t-¥j 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COIMISSIONE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF >1AILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correc t copy of the foregoing ORDER to the P l a i n t i f f , by mail ing 
the same, postage prepaid, addressed t o : LARRY R. KELLER, 
ATTORNEY AT LAW, 257 TOWER SUITE 340, 257 EAST 200 SOUTH - 10, 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84111. 
Dated t h i s / / j _ a a y of October, 1991. 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
APPENDIX 8 
I've been meaning to say this for a long time but after 
yesterday's experience I think it is best that I don't bring Tony 
down until Mark comes back to town. I feel this way for several 
reasons. The first being, the way you treat me as a person. You 
act like I owe you the visits to Tony. Dick especially doesn't 
miss a chance to yell and this intimidates me and brings back the 
same feelings of fear that Cameron used to cause me. I don't 
deserve this. I have been a good mother and you don't have any 
right to treat me this way. 
Secondly: the way Michelle was treated. She was an innocent 
person trying to do you a favor and you treated her very 
harshly. It makes me mad to hear that Dick said " She (meaning 
me) always does this and she should get her act together" because 
I have always bent over backwards to let you see Tony. Even my 
own parents did not have him over the weekend every other week 
nor do your parents get your kids every other week. I am not 
responsible to take Chris to Darren's parents nor am I 
responsible to take Tony to Cameron's parents. 
I have been doing this for you out of kindness because I realize 
Cameron didn't bring him over. 
Thirdly: I don't like the way you question other people about 
what I am doing. It is none of your business. I told you a 
while back that I would let you see Tony when I was in town and 
you don't need to hassel my family and friends. 
As you know, I am leaving soon and I am not sure when I will be 
back but when both Mark and I are back we will bring Tony to see 
you. 
